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UCLA LAW REVIEW

Transparently Opaque: Understanding
the Lack of Transparency in Insurance
Consumer Protection
Daniel Schwarcz
Abstract
Consumer protection in most domains of financial regulation centers on transparency.
Broadly construed, transparency involves making relevant information available to
consumers as well as others who might act on their behalf, such as academics, journalists,
newspapers, consumer organizations, or other market watchdogs. By contrast,
command-and-control regulation that affirmatively limits financial firms’ products or
pricing is relatively uncommon. This Article describes an anomalous inversion of this
pattern: While state insurance regulation frequently employs aggressive commandand-control consumer protection regulation, it typically does little or nothing to
promote transparent markets. Rather, state lawmakers routinely either completely
ignore transparency-oriented reforms or implement them in a flawed manner. While
acknowledging the limits of transparency-oriented consumer protection regulation, this
Article argues that the lack of transparent insurance markets reflects a pervasive and
unappreciated flaw in state insurance regulation. Despite their limitations, transparencyoriented regulatory strategies are an important complement to other more aggressive
regulatory tools because they can promote consumer choice, harness market discipline,
and ensure regulatory accountability in ways that more aggressive regulatory tools often
cannot. In order to promote more transparent insurance markets, the Article argues
that the jurisdiction of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should be expanded
to encompass consumer protection in insurance.
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INTRODUCTION
A central goal of financial regulation is to promote markets that are more
transparent for consumers and retail investors. Consumer protections in banking
consequently focus predominantly on disclosures,1 and securities law aims to protect retail investors principally through disclosure and antifraud rules.2 Although
the subprime mortgage crisis revealed important limitations to these approaches,3
federal financial regulation has hardly abandoned transparency as a consumer
protection priority. To the contrary, it has embraced the need for better and
more empirically informed transparency initiatives, while acknowledging that
these efforts must often be paired with complementary substantive restrictions.4
One domain of financial regulation, however, has consistently and repeatedly failed to embrace market transparency as a regulatory tool: state insurance
regulation. In both property/casualty and life insurance—the two insurance arenas that the states predominantly regulate5—lawmakers and regulators have routinely resisted transparency-oriented consumer protections, even though

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
349 (4th ed. 2009).
See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1043 (2009) (describing securities law’s “habitual use
of the disclosure remedy for purposes of retail investor protection”).
See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 196–98 (2011); Omri Ben-Shahar &
Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011).
For instance, while the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) enjoys
broad regulatory authority, many of its initial efforts have focused on producing better
consumer disclosures of mortgages and student loans while increasing the information
available to market watchdogs. See generally Thomas P. Brown, Disclosure—An Unappreciated
Tool in the CFPB’s Arsenal, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 209 (2011). In 2009, the Credit Card Accountability and Responsibility and Disclosure Act amended the Truth in Lending Act to
require credit card companies to post their contracts online and to disclose on billing
statements the interest-rate costs of making only minimum payments. Truth in Lending Act of
1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (2012). And healthcare reform focuses a substantial and underappreciated
amount of attention on improving transparency in health insurance markets through the
development of better summary disclosures, the establishment of exchanges, and the
mandatory publication of claim payment information. See Karen Pollitz & Larry Levitt,
Health Insurance Transparency Under the Affordable Care Act, HENRY J. KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2012), http://kff.org/health-reform/perspective/health-insurancetransparency-under-the-affordable-care-act.aspx.
By virtue of the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012), states are the
primary regulators of insurance markets when federal law does not expressly preempt this
authority. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, ABRAHAM’S INSURANCE
LAW AND REGULATION 32 (5th ed. Supp. 2010).
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analogous safeguards are common in federal financial regulation.6 Thus, stateregulated insurers are virtually never required to provide consumers with standardized summaries of key coverage terms before purchase.7 Insurers’ provision of
rate information is largely unregulated, often preventing consumers from effectively comparing premiums on an apples-to-apples basis.8 And state laws actually
forbid insurers and their agents from informing consumers about the protections
they enjoy through state guarantee funds.9
Even more importantly, state laws and regulations do remarkably little to
promote broad public availability of insurance market information. For example,
insurance carriers are not required to make their policies publicly accessible to anyone other than existing policyholders.10 Similarly, regulators generally do not
publish any company-specific information on how often individual carriers deny
or delay claims, drop policyholders for making claims, rescind coverage, or charge
surrender fees.11 And even the financial health of insurers is actively shrouded by
state regulators.12
While state insurance regulation generally shuns transparency-oriented
consumer protection, it often embraces aggressive substantive regulation. For instance, states frequently (though unevenly) restrict insurers’ pricing decisions,13

6.

7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

One other commentator has noted this pattern, at least with respect to the life insurance
industry. See Joseph M. Belth, The Disclosure Approach to the Problem of Deceptive Practices in
the Life Insurance Industry, 21 INS. F. 81, 82–83 (1994) (“Insurance regulation is based on
nondisclosure of material information to policyowners and prospective policyowners; the
theory is that they will be protected by the regulators. In contrast, securities regulation is
based on disclosure of material information to investors and prospective investors; the theory
is that they will protect themselves if they are given the important information.”).
Additionally, Howell Jackson has noted that state insurance regulation tends to make use of
much more aggressive regulatory tools than other forms of financial regulation, a result that
he attributes to the relative complexity of insurance. Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a
Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 333–
34 (1999).
See infra Part II.B, Coverage Consistent with Consumers’ Reasonable Expectations; cf.
Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263,
1332–34 (2011) (discussing the lack of substantive information about coverage that insurers
provide on a prepurchase basis).
See infra Part III.D, Improving Consumer Understanding of the Cost of Cash-Value
Life Policies.
See infra Part III.A, Solvency Regulation.
See Schwarcz, supra note 7; infra Part II.B, Coverage Consistent with Consumers’ Reasonable
Expectations.
See infra Part III.B, Informing Consumers About Guarantee Fund Protection.
See infra Part III.A, Solvency Regulation.
See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Anti-discrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2135800.
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mandate specific policy provisions,14 require carriers to operate unprofitable policy lines,15 and insist on capital and reserve requirements that are based on uniquely conservative accounting standards.16 This suite of regulatory approaches often
leads observers to note that insurance is the most heavily regulated of all financial
sectors.17
This inverted pattern of consumer protection regulation—aggressive commandand-control rules combined with limited market transparency—is not simply
anomalous. It is dysfunctional. Transparency-oriented consumer financial protection is, despite its limitations,18 a vital complement to other regulatory tools.
Properly executed, transparency can help empower consumers to make better decisions about how to purchase and use financial products. Even more importantly,
it can promote market discipline and facilitate “smart disclosure” to “fuel the creation of products and tools that benefit consumers.”19 To be sure, these benefits
will often need supplementing by various more aggressive regulatory tools. Unfortunately, transparency-based regulation is often treated as a substitute for more
aggressive forms of regulation.20 But this Article attempts to transcend this narrow perspective, emphasizing that transparency-based regulation is often a vital
complement to effective substantive regulation.
This Article demonstrates these points in the context of state insurance regulation, showing how regulator-facilitated transparency could substantially improve the efficiency of insurance markets. In some cases, transparency-based tools
could almost certainly achieve regulatory objectives more effectively at less cost
than current substantive regulations. For example, enabling consumers to compare prices meaningfully would be more effective and less expensive than state rate
regulation.21 In most cases, though, the Article argues that enhanced market
transparency would be an essential complement to substantive regulation. It
could allow sophisticated consumers, advocates, and journalists to police the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1270–71.
Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 293, 300–08 (1999).
See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation?: Against
Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1763–64 n.256 (2010).
See, e.g., J. David Cummins, Property-Liability Insurance Price Deregulation: The Last Bastion?,
in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION
AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 1 (J. David Cummins ed., 2002).
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 723.
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, SMART DISCLOSURE AND CONSUMER DECISION
MAKING: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SMART DISCLOSURE 7 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/report_of_the_task_force_on
_smart_disclosure.pdf; see infra Part I.B, Transparency, Full Disclosure, and Market Discipline.
See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 681.
See infra Part II.E, Affordable Insurance Rates and Improving Consumers’ Ability to Comparison Shop.
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marketplace in tandem with regulators, empower informed consumers to make
better choices among competing products, promote better consumer usage of
their policies, and prompt more effective enforcement of substantive rules.
Given the pervasive and longstanding failure of state lawmakers and regulators to promote transparent insurance markets, this Article proposes that the jurisdiction of the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) should
be expanded to include insurance products. The CFPB’s focus on market transparency makes it well suited to tackle the opaqueness of state insurance markets.
Perhaps even more importantly, extending the CFPB’s jurisdiction to insurance
would motivate state insurance regulators to promote market transparency. The
history of state insurance regulation strongly suggests that state regulators can,
and will, act when necessary to maintain the scope of their authority.22 The prospect of federal preemption by CFPB regulation would thus likely force state insurance regulators to pay attention to the behaviorally and empirically informed
principles of market transparency that are at the heart of modern consumer protection.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of transparencyoriented consumer protection. It argues that regulatory measures that directly
seek to improve the decisions of individual consumers are an essential tool in regulators’ arsenal. Even more significantly, Part I emphasizes the importance of full
disclosure as a regulatory tool for promoting consumer financial protection. Such disclosure aims to make large quantities of standardized market information broadly
and easily available. Its primary goal is not to directly inform consumers but rather to promote market discipline or smart disclosure by facilitating the efforts of
market intermediaries.
Parts II and III then focus on the lack of transparency-oriented consumer
protection in property/casualty and life/annuity insurance markets, respectively.
In both cases, state insurance regulation either completely forgoes transparencyoriented approaches or relies on inadequate approaches, at least when federal law
has not demanded otherwise. By contrast, federal financial regulations in banking, securities, and health insurance domains employ more effective and thoughtful strategies to promote market transparency. Parts II and III argue that similar
transparency-oriented reforms could effectively complement more aggressive
forms of regulatory scrutiny.
Part IV concludes by offering at least a partial explanation for why state insurance regulation has so consistently failed to develop transparency-oriented
consumer protection and by describing how to remedy that failure. Although
22.

See infra Part III, Adequacy of Transparency Regulation in Life Insurance and Annuities.
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numerous factors seem to contribute to the blind spots of state insurance regulation, Part IV concludes that this problem is amenable to a relatively simple and
practical solution. Empowering the CFPB to regulate state insurance markets
would almost certainly cause states to pay more attention to the need for enhanced
transparency in insurance markets. And, to the extent that state efforts remain unsatisfactory, the CFPB’s review and analysis of state insurance regulation would
serve as an ideal precursor to a more generalized federalization of insurance regulation.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF TRANSPARENCY-ORIENTED CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION

Transparency-oriented consumer protection can be subdivided into two
categories.23 The first seeks to increase awareness of relevant information by
reaching consumers of insurance products directly. Subpart A describes the
potential benefits and limitations of this approach, focusing on four specific strategies: summary disclosures, financial literacy education, antifraud and antideception
measures, and structured products and markets. Subpart B then moves to a second, and ultimately more promising, category of transparency-oriented consumer protection: full disclosure that makes relevant information broadly and
easily available to the public, reaching insurance consumers indirectly through
various types of intermediaries. This form of transparency can improve the disciplining force of firm reputation and enhance the incentives of regulators to proactively identify and address market problems.
A.

Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking

Many consumer financial protections are designed to deliver relevant information to individuals in order to improve their financial decisionmaking. Unfortunately, accomplishing this is no easy task. Consumers have limited cognitive
resources and background knowledge to devote to understanding complex and
ever-changing financial products. Nonetheless, well-designed regulation can
meaningfully improve consumer decisionmaking in a variety of settings. This
Subpart describes four regulatory tools for accomplishing this goal.

23.

Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 628–29 (2005); Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of
Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to the Heads of the Executive Departments and Agencies,
Disclosure and Simplification as Regulatory Tools (June 18, 2010), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure_principles.pdf.
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1. Summary Disclosures
Summary disclosure is the most familiar regulatory tool for improving consumer decisionmaking. Such disclosure highlights specific information that is
particularly important for making an informed financial decision.24 Most frequently, this information concerns product attributes, such as fee schedules, penalty terms, or other contract provisions.25 But it can also involve other
information, such as expected consumer use patterns or the obligations and incentives of the seller/intermediary.26
Historically, most attempts to mandate summary disclosures have proven
ineffective.27 In large part, this is because lawmakers and regulators have often
embraced mandatory disclosure as a regulatory tool without paying meaningful
attention to its specific design and implementation.28 As a result, mandatory disclosures are often lengthy, complicated, and delivered to consumers after the
point of sale, when consumers have little incentive to pay attention.29 Some
prominent commentators have used this record of ineffectiveness to persuasively
argue for the abandonment of mandatory consumer disclosures.30
But despite their historical failings, mandatory consumer disclosures
can indeed promote various specific regulatory goals if they are properly
designed and executed.31 Numerous examples of successful mandatory
disclosure exist, including nutritional food labeling,32 ATM fee disclo-

24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 3.
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3.
See Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS L.
REV. 93, 98 (2010).
See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3; William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred
Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant With the Economic and Psychological
Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1133–34 (1984)
(arguing that Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosures are ineffective).
Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for
the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1163–64 (2012) (describing reasons
many consumers failed to use disclosures and efforts by the CFPB to resolve the issues).
See generally Onnig H. Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 60
AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1291 (2011).
See Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclaimers in
Advertising, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 293 (2012). See generally Ben-Shahar &
Schneider, supra note 3.
See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY (2007); Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to
Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 338 (2013).
See, e.g., John Kozup et al., Sound Disclosures: Assessing When a Disclosure Is Worthwhile, 31 J.
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 313, 316 (2012) (arguing that sound disclosures, such as
nutritional food labeling, can achieve regulatory objectives).
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sures,33 payday loan disclosures,34 mortgage disclosures,35 and consumer safety
disclosures.36 These disclosures not only promote better consumer decisionmaking but can also impact the firms’ behavior by altering their decisionmaking calculus.37
To be sure, no form of summary disclosure will be perfectly effective. Indeed, even some of the comparatively successful forms of mandatory disclosure
described above have been heavily criticized in recent research.38 But in most of
these cases, critics argue that these forms of disclosure are less effective than they
could be; few commentators argue that these forms of disclosure are completely
ineffective.39 To the contrary, if there is one theme that permeates the vast literature on summary disclosures, it is that their effectiveness is vitally contingent on
their design and implementation.40

33.
34.

35.

36.
37.

38.

39.
40.

See Adam J. Levitin, Consumer Finance: Law, Business and Policy (2013) (textbook draft)
(finding that that consumers withdraw larger amounts at automatic teller machines when
they are warned that a fee will be imposed on each withdrawal).
Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and Payday
Borrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1865, 1865–93 (2011) (finding in an experimental setting that short
disclosures to payday loan consumers provided on the envelopes in which cash is disbursed
can improve decisionmaking over time).
James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, The Failure and Promise of Mandated Consumer
Mortgage Disclosures: Evidence From Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled Experiment With
Mortgage Borrowers, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 516, 518–19 (2010) (finding that improved
TILA disclosures can improve consumer decisionmaking).
See Eli. P Cox III et al., Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior?: A Meta-analysis, 16 J.
PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 195, 201 (1997) (finding that product warnings can improve
consumer safety).
See Richard H. Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter Consumers, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 3, 6 (noting a study finding that after levels of trans fat were
required to be disclosed on nutritional labels, food and beverage companies altered their
production and advertising of products); see also Craswell, supra note 31, at 334 (labeling this
effect, which he notes also is applicable to summary disclosure, as dynamic disclosure, because
disclosure has the effect of impacting the choice sets available to consumers).
See, e.g., Sophie Hieke & Charles R. Taylor, A Critical Review of the Literature on Nutritional
Labeling, 46 J. CONSUMER AFF. 120 (2012); Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information
Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012) (arguing that the implementation of
restaurant hygiene grading suffers serious flaws, including grade inflation and inconsistency).
See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 31, at 350.
See, e.g., J. Craig Andrews, Warnings and Disclosures, in COMMUNICATING RISKS AND
BENEFITS: AN EVIDENCE-BASED USER’S GUIDE 149 (Baruch Fischhoff et al. eds., 2011);
David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 155 (2006); see also, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Oliver Board, Product-Use Information and
the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure, 14 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 235 (2012) (arguing that
mandated disclosure of product-use information has substantial potential to improve
consumer outcomes if designed effectively); Margaret C. Campbell et al., Can Disclosures
Lead Consumers to Resist Covert Persuasion?: The Important Roles of Disclosure Timing and Type
of Response, 4 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 23 (2013) (reporting that properly designed disclosure can correct the nefarious impact of covert product sponsorship).
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Three basic principles for designing effective mandatory disclosures can be
distilled from this literature. First, disclosures must focus consumers’ attention
on a small number of key pieces of information directed to solving specific regulatory problems.41 The reason is simple: Most consumers can or will process only a
limited amount of information in a disclosure.42 In some cases, disclosures can
overcome this limitation by combining relevant information into a simple rating
or ranking.43 Examples include letter grades for restaurant cleanliness44 and ratings for automobile safety and fuel efficiency.45 Alternatively, product use disclosures can be embedded within product attribute disclosures so that consumers are
simultaneously informed about both features when making their decisions.46
Mandatory disclosures regarding automobile fuel efficiency and cigarette nicotine
and tar levels fit this description.47
Although it is the most vital element of designing an effective disclosure,
determining the appropriate information to include in a disclosure is often immensely difficult, particularly for inherently complicated products. Some disclosure metrics may invite gaming by firms, who seek to influence or confuse
consumers by altering products in ways that change how they appear in disclosures but do not improve consumer welfare.48 Other times, poorly designed disclosures can inadvertently reinforce behavioral biases by focusing consumer
41.
42.

43.

44.

45.
46.
47.
48.

See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1089 (2007) (emphasizing the importance of using disclosure to target specific regulatory problems).
See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 584 (2006) (“Increasing the prominence of a
required disclosure may also reduce the attention consumers pay to other information . . . .”); Russell
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1203, 1241–44 (2003).
Of course, for these approaches to be effective, consumers must understand what the
underlying metrics mean or, at the very least, how to compare ratings to determine which is
purportedly better. Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 5. For example,
there is evidence that many consumers do not understand what the annual percentage rate
(APR) means or whether a higher or a lower APR is better. See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Preventing
Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act
Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 776–77 (2010).
See Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence From
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q.J. ECON. 409 (2003) (finding that restaurant hygiene grades
in Los Angeles cause improved restaurant hygiene and increased consumer responsiveness to
restaurant). But see Ho, supra note 38 (arguing that implementation of restaurant hygiene grading
suffers serious flaws).
See Craswell, supra note 31, at 357.
See Bar-Gill & Ferarri, supra note 26.
See id. at 106–09.
See, e.g., Ho, supra note 38, at 609–16 (showing how restaurants can game their ratings for
hygiene and produce “grade inflation”); Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1049–50 (noting how
mutual fund companies can frustrate cost comparisons by creating different types of fee
arrangements).
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attention on issues of secondary concern.49 But none of these results are inevitable, particularly if regulators are attuned to these difficulties.
Second, regulators should design and test mandatory summary disclosure
forms that incorporate fields for individual firms to populate with relevant product and/or consumer characteristics.50 Examples include nutritional food labels
and recently revamped mortgage, credit card, and health insurance disclosures.
When all firms use a centrally designed disclosure template, consumers can more
easily compare product features and prices across companies. Consumers are also
much more likely to learn how to use uniform disclosure templates. Finally,
regulators can more efficiently test standard forms for consumer comprehension.51 Such testing is increasingly routine at federal agencies52 and helps ensure
that consumers actually understand and can act on summary disclosures.53
Third, consumers must receive consumer disclosures at the appropriate
time, when they are most likely to capture consumers’ attention and inform their
decisionmaking.54 Thus, consumers must receive disclosures intended to pro-

49.
50.

51.
52.

53.

54.

See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 2, at 1051 (noting how disclosures of past performance of
mutual funds may enhance irrational trend chasing).
See Brenda J. Cude & Daniel Schwarcz, Consumer Viewpoints on Effective Disclosures, CIPR
NEWSL. (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs & Ctr. for Ins. Policy & Research, Kansas City, Mo.),
Jan. 2013, at 26, 30, available at http://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol6_
consumer_viewpoints.pdf (noting that regulator-designed disclosures create consistency across
firms, making comparisons easier for consumers); Susan L. Rutledge, Consumer Protection
and Financial Literacy: Lessons From Nine Country Studies 19–21 (World Bank Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 5326, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619168.
Ensuring effective consumer testing is very difficult when firms draft their own disclosures, as
the number of disclosures that must be tested increases from one to the number of firms
operating in the market place.
See generally JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS (2007); see also Memorandum from
Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 5, 7.
See Kennedy et al., supra note 28, at 1160–67 (discussing federal efforts to improve mortgage
loan disclosures). Untested disclosures often prove ineffective because the experts who draft
them are uniquely unsuited to determine what is comprehensible to ordinary consumers. See,
e.g., Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers Direct Health Care?,
35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 42 (2009) (noting that a large number of healthcare disclosure forms
are too complex for the average American adult); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield,
Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 240–41 (2002) (examining the literacy
skill level required to understand consumer loan and automobile lease documents).
See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 694 (1996);
Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 3–4. But cf. Lauren E. Willis,
Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L.
REV. 707, 749–50 (2006) (describing the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) mortgage disclosures, which are designed to facilitate comparison shopping and
are provided only after the opportunity to comparison shop has passed).
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mote comparison shopping before emotionally committing to a purchase or
spending a substantial amount of time and energy learning about or applying for a
product. Similarly, disclosures designed to limit overdraft fees are most likely to
be effective if they are delivered at the point of sale, at the time when purchase
could cause consumers to exceed their credit limit.55 By contrast, disclosures intended to alter long-term consumer behavior may be most usefully provided after
the point of sale,56 when they are least likely to be undermined by sales people
who may have incentives to downplay their relevance or importance.57 Finally,
mandatory summary disclosures must be provided at a time when consumers will
not be overwhelmed by other disclosures.58 To accomplish this, regulators should
not only specify the time frames within which disclosures should be provided but
also limit or prohibit providing additional disclosures to consumers at that time.
To be sure, even mandatory disclosures that meet these criteria will only be
imperfectly effective: Consumers will always err. But mandatory disclosure is
simply one tool in a regulator’s tool kit and can generally be employed in concert
with other approaches, such as minimum product requirements or regulatory
preapproval. Additionally, mandatory disclosure has important advantages over
other regulatory tools. First, it does not interfere with consumer choice. Second,
and perhaps less fully appreciated, it can help consumers use products effectively.
For instance, disclosure can encourage people to withdraw funds from automatic
teller machines less frequently, to use overdraft protection only when truly needed, or to refrain from submitting insurance claims that are only slightly above
one’s deductible.
2. Financial Literacy Education
A second form of transparency-oriented consumer protection is financial
literacy education, which can be defined as “education about financial concepts
undertaken with the explicit purpose of increasing knowledge and the skills, confidence, and motivation to use it.”59 Such education is designed to empower individual consumers to make responsible financial decisions by equipping them with
a core amount of financial literacy and the skills necessary to analyze individual

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS 192 (2006).
See Bertrand & Morse, supra note 34, at 1865–93 (finding that disclosures on envelopes
containing cash had a gradual effect on consumers’ payday lending habits).
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 739 (arguing that a disclosure mandate could
backfire when the discloser has strategic reason to give false and biased assurances).
See Craswell, supra note 42, at 581.
Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 202 (2008).
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financial products. It is generally provided before the point of purchase through
classroom teaching, informational websites, and brochures or guides.
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of financial literacy education is
generally not encouraging. Most studies report that such education has little or no
effect on consumers’ actual financial decisions.60 And at least some of the studies
that report favorable outcomes as a result of financial literacy education are subject
to important methodological flaws, such as self-selection bias and data collection
techniques that tend to be biased toward favorable outcomes.61
But this does not mean that financial literacy education can never promote
regulatory goals: Emerging evidence suggests that financial literacy education can
indeed have a positive, albeit small, effect when provided immediately before a
specific financial decision that individuals are motivated to make correctly.62 Indeed, in some sense, a mandatory summary disclosure is a form of highly contextspecific consumer financial literacy education. It should therefore not be surprising
that financial literacy education, like disclosure, can produce positive results when
it is provided to consumers at the appropriate time and is otherwise well designed. By contrast, most forms of financial literacy education fail to impact consumer decisionmaking positively. Often this is because, due to various cognitive
constraints, individuals fail to link such education to specific transactions about
which they are motivated.63
3. Antifraud and Antideception Rules
Transparency-based consumer financial protection regulation almost universally includes rules prohibiting firms and individuals from making false or misleading statements. Thus, false and deceptive practices are prohibited in securities law,64

60.

61.
62.

63.
64.

See, e.g., Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on
Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 577–79 (2001); Lisa J.
Servon & Robert Kaestner, Consumer Financial Literacy and the Impact of Online Banking on
the Financial Behavior of Lower-Income Bank Customers, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 271 (2008).
But see Jonathan Fox et al., Building the Case for Financial Education, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF.
195 (2005).
Willis, supra note 59, at 205–07 (describing these problems in detail).
See Lewis Mandell & Linda Schmid Klein, Motivation and Financial Literacy, 16 FIN.
SERVICES REV. 105 (2007) (finding that motivation of individuals significantly impacts the
effectiveness of financial literacy education); Rutledge, supra note 50, at 2 (emphasizing that
financial literacy should be provided at “teachable moments”).
See Daniel Fernandes et al., Financial Literacy, Financial Education and Downstream Financial
Behaviors, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2333898.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
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consumer credit law,65 and insurance law.66 The application of these rules to outright fraud is typically straightforward as a legal or regulatory matter. By contrast,
the impact of these rules on deceptive or misleading practices depends almost entirely on how they are enforced. That is because deception is a broad and malleable standard, and hence must be defined ex post via application of the standard to
specific cases.67 The enforcement of these rules is typically most robust when individuals have a private cause of action to pursue claims of deception, as individuals
often have better, or at least different, information than regulators about the existence of deceptive practices.68 But traditional regulatory enforcement of
antideception rules can also contribute substantially to transparent markets by limiting deceptive advertising and marketing.
4. Structuring Markets and/or Products
One of the most promising regulatory strategies for directly promoting improved consumer decisionmaking is for regulators to structure markets or products to create clearer, and often more limited, choices for consumers. Perhaps the
most salient examples of this approach are the health insurance exchanges that
the Affordable Care Act requires to be operational in every state by 2014.69 These
exchanges are regulated and centralized marketplaces wherein private firms sell
their products to consumers according to prespecified rules designed to facilitate
consumer choice.
Available empirical evidence suggests that exchanges can be quite effective
at promoting transparent markets.70 All exchanges have the important virtue of
reducing consumer search costs by aggregating relevant information in a single
place. They also generally allow consumers to sort plans according to preferred
features such as actuarial value, deductibles, copays, or whether a particular doctor
is in network.
Depending on how they are structured, exchanges can also promote market
transparency through more aggressive strategies. For instance, exchanges can
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 753, 124 Stat. 1376, 1750 (2010).
See NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 880-1 (1997).
See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 591 (1992).
See Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 749, 771–
73 (2013).
See Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 139–41 (2011).
See generally Jon Kingsdale, Health Insurance Exchanges—Key Link in a Better-Value Chain,
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2147 (2010) (using Massachusetts’s Commonwealth Health
Insurance Connector as an example to suggest that exchanges can successfully promote
transparency).
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provide a seal-of-approval function if only prescreened products are sold in the
exchange.71 They can also require standardization of certain product features,
which promotes comparison shopping by reducing the number of relevant variables a consumer must consider.72 Finally, exchanges can also function as automated “recommender systems” that match consumers with a small number of
products on the basis of consumer-specified needs and preferences.73 This can
have a dramatic impact by limiting consumers’ “consideration sets” to a limited
number of options that are more likely to be appropriate for their needs.74
Product standardization outside of an exchange is an alternative approach to
promoting more transparent consumer markets. For instance, Medigap insurance policies must fit one of eleven specified benefit designs in regulations.75
Product standardization can promote transparency by reducing reading costs for
consumers: Rather than familiarizing themselves with numerous different product types, consumers need learn only the basic details of a few different options.76
This approach is most likely to be effective when the alternatives differ on a single
dimension.77 Moreover, product standardization may facilitate learning from
friends and family by creating a common set of choices.
A less intrusive alternative to product standardization is to require firms to offer a standardized default product but to permit opt-out through affirmative consumer action. This approach may force firms to explain how any nonstandardized
products they offer depart from the standardized option.78 Unfortunately, firms
71.
72.

73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

78.

Id.
See, e.g., Rosemarie Day & Pamela Nadash, New State Insurance Exchanges Should Follow the
Example of Massachusetts by Simplifying Choices Among Health Plans, 31 HEALTH AFF. 982,
982–85 (2012) (discussing how the Massachusetts exchange successfully promoted comparison
shopping by standardizing products and limiting the number of health insurance options).
See John Lynch, An Invitation to Research on Consumers’ Financial Decision Making (June
6, 2010) (PowerPoint Presentation at the First Annual Boulder Summer Conference on
Consumer Financial Decision Making), available at http://129.82.41.134/MPPCWorkshop/
Documents/WorkshopPresentations/Lynch%20Financial%20Decision%20Making.pdf.
See Allan D. Shocker et al., Consideration Set Influences on Consumer Decision-Making and
Choice: Issues, Models, and Suggestions, 2 MARKETING LETTERS 181, 188–92 (1991); see also
Fernandes et al., supra note 63.
See How to Compare Medigap Policies, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/
supplement-other-insurance/compare-medigap/compare-medigap.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2013).
See Abraham L. Wickelgren, Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of Form
Contracts, 167 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 30, 38–40 (2011).
SUSAN E. WOODWARD, URBAN INST., A STUDY OF CLOSING COSTS FOR FHA MORTGAGES
(2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411682_fha_mortgages.pdf (noting
that encouraging comparison heightens competition and improves consumer outcomes only in
markets in which the alternatives differ on a single dimension).
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1989).
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may be able to game certain legally required defaults by manipulating consumers to
opt out of those defaults.79 One potential approach to ameliorating this risk is to
afford greater legal protections to sales of default options than sales of nondefault
options.80
B.

Transparency, Full Disclosure, and Market Discipline

A second broad category of transparency-based consumer financial protection, which can be labeled full disclosure, provides public access to a broad set of
potentially relevant market and product information. Such disclosure is generally
provided through online tools. Unlike the regulatory approaches described above,
the primary audience for full disclosure is not (at least initially) ordinary consumers
or retail investors. Instead, the intended audience includes market intermediaries,
consumer-oriented magazines, journalists, consumer advocates, academics, sophisticated consumers/investors, and government actors without direct access to
the underlying information.81
The most familiar, and elaborate, example of full disclosure is the federal securities regime, which imposes exhaustive disclosure requirements on securities
issuers.82 Doing so protects all investors, even though only a small handful actually read these disclosures.83 The core reason is that most securities are actively

79.
80.

81.
82.

83.

See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1220 (2013).
See MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., NEW AM. FOUND., BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL
SERVICES REGULATION 7–11 (2008) (suggesting that regulators require lenders to offer
plain vanilla products, but also permit them to offer more complex products, though with less
protection against judicial intrusion); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities
Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 2028–35 (2010) (suggesting a “conform or explain”
approach to retail investment products).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1384–85 (2011).
To be sure, many scholars dispute the need for so much mandatory disclosure in securities
regulation. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 687 (1984); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light:
Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417,
421 (2003) (“Critics of mandatory disclosure argue that a company will voluntarily disclose
information that investors demand in order to reduce its cost of capital and avoid any
discount that the market might apply to the company’s stock price if investors think that they
have too little information to evaluate the company and its securities properly or, worse yet, if
investors think that the company is hiding something.”).
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723–37, 751–53 (1984) (suggesting that mandatory disclosure is
a strategy for making efficient use of securities analysts and market professionals); Zohar
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J.
711, 781–82 (2006) (arguing that securities regulation, the role of which is to facilitate and
maintain a competitive market for traders, benefits from mandatory disclosures because
disclosures reduce costs and increase market competition).
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sold on secondary markets, allowing prices to fluctuate according to new information that is traded on by sophisticated actors. Thus, even uninformed investors can be assured that securities prices are reasonably reflective of their actual
worth.
Full disclosure, however, can be an important and effective consumer protection strategy even in contexts in which no secondary market exists. First, full
disclosure can allow entrepreneurial market intermediaries or others, such as regulators, to design their own smart disclosure systems.84 Such systems translate
available raw data into tailored disclosures for consumers through mobile apps
and internet sites.85 These privately designed consumer information tools are
particularly promising because they are mediated by market forces, thus ensuring
a more nimble, evolving, and sophisticated approach to communicating useful
information to consumers according to their particular needs and preferences.
For these reasons, policymakers have proposed or actively implemented smart
disclosure in a wide variety of settings, ranging from GPS information to 401(k)
plans to credit cards contracts.86 But the key ingredient in empowering entrepreneurial market intermediaries to design smart disclosure tools is data. Without
standardized, easily available data, the costs to intermediaries of collecting and
analyzing consumer products, use patterns, and practices can be prohibitive.87
Second, full disclosure can increase market discipline even in the absence of
smart disclosure by facilitating the efforts of market intermediaries and consumer
watchdogs to independently assess product quality and appropriateness and make
recommendations accordingly.88 This effect may have been significantly en-

84.
85.
86.

87.
88.

See, e.g., COMM. ON TECH., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, CHARTER OF THE TASK FORCE
ON SMART DISCLOSURE: INFORMATION AND EFFICIENCY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/tfsd_charter_signed.pdf.
See id.
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 95–96, 145–46 (2008); Memorandum from
Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Informing Consumers Through Smart Disclosure 3–4 (Sept. 8,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/
informing-consumers-through-smart-disclosure.pdf.
See Thaler & Tucker, supra note 37, at 9.
See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 cmt. e, at
133 (2009) (“Transferors will also be mindful of watchdog groups that can easily access the
standard form and can spread the word about the use of unsavory terms.”); Ronald Chen &
Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2004) (“Consumer-oriented groups, such as the
Consumers Union, act as informers and watchdogs on behalf of consumers.”); William M.
Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1701, 1737 (1999) (noting that full disclosure allows market intermediaries to “locate
information relevant to parties they represent, analyze and distill it, and communicate it fairly
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hanced in recent years by social media, which decreases the costs to market intermediaries of communicating with consumers and increases the capacity of
consumers to communicate with one another.89 Indeed, the mere threat of these
effects may have a substantial disciplining effect on firms, deterring them from
imposing new fees or hidden unfair terms.
Although the capacity of market intermediaries armed with full information
to police private firms varies,90 there are numerous important recent examples of
this process operating effectively. For instance, the public availability of contracts
has helped to prevent unfair or deceptive terms for software,91 cars,92 social media
websites,93 and cell phones.94 The power of full disclosure extends to various other regulatory issues as well. For example, when the Department of Labor made
broad disclosures about 401(k) plans available online, a market intermediary used
this information to rate different plans, which in turn generated decreased fees
and enhanced competition.95 Similarly, full disclosure has proven effective in a
broad range of environmental regulatory contexts.96 In campaign finance law, full

89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

and accessibly to individual consumers”). Even Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider, the
most vocal critics of disclosure-based consumer protection, seem to admit the potential
importance of this type of disclosure. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 732
(“There are, to be sure, areas in which disclosures are aimed directly at sophisticated
intermediaries, and where the presence of such intermediaries produces a desirable effect for
the nonreading populous. . . . But these contexts are few and far between.”). For one recent
example of this phenomenon, consider Ian Ayres et al., Skeletons in the Database: An Early
Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints (John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., &
Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 475, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2295157.
See William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1109–16, 1156.
The effectiveness of full disclosure is not always clear. For instance, some argue that
performance disclosure requirements for credit rating agencies have failed to reward credit
rating agencies with more accurate credit ratings. See, e.g., Lynn Bai, The Performance
Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They Effective Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS. 47, 69, 101–04 (2010).
See, e.g., Larry Magid, It Pays to Read License Agreements, PC PITSTOP, http://www.pcpitstop.com/
spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
See, e.g., David Gilo & Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconscionability Through a Market Lens, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 133, 164 n.73 (2010).
See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 89.
See, e.g., Gilo & Porat, supra note 92, at 159, 164–67.
See Thaler & Tucker, supra note 37, at 5.
See generally Mark Stephan, Environmental Information Disclosure Programs: They Work, but
Why?, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 190 (2002) (noting the beneficial role that information disclosure
programs have played in environmental policy and discussing theories for how and why these
programs are successful). Perhaps the most well-known example is the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-To-Know Act, which required companies to publicly report the
amounts of hazardous chemicals they released into the environment. The result was a
dramatic reduction in the release of toxic chemicals. See Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing
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disclosure is frequently credited with deterring corruption and promoting more
effective enforcement of other types of election laws.97
A third value of mandatory full disclosure is that it promotes regulatory accountability.98 Market intermediaries with access to relevant data not only have
the ability to convey information about product or service quality and appropriateness to consumers but they also have the capacity to identify consumer protection problems in need of a regulatory solution.99 For instance, numerous studies
using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data have helped to identify discriminatory lending practices and prompted various initiatives to make credit
more available in traditionally underserved areas.100 Similarly, a recent report by
the Pew Health Group reviewed online credit card contracts in an effort to
demonstrate that unfair terms were still common and to influence the implementation of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act
(Credit CARD Act) in 2009.101 And in California, the public availability of

About the Public Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVT’L L. 217, 218–20 (1996).
97. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure
Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 295 (2005) (“Those who support more
extensive campaign finance regulation usually favor disclosure as a necessary component that
serves the traditional objective in candidate elections of combating corruption and also
provides necessary information to voters in both candidate and issue elections.”).
98. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-268, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE:
DATA ON APPLICATION AND COVERAGE DENIALS 2 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d11268.pdf.
99. See Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some
Evidence From Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL
INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 365 (Daniel Carpenter
& David A. Moss eds., 2014) (noting that public interest groups are capable of influencing
and scrutinizing regulatory measures through the media and public outreach).
100. See, e.g., DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
LOST GROUND, 2011: DISPARITIES IN MORTGAGE LENDING AND FORECLOSURES 31
(2011) (finding that “low-income and minority borrowers and neighborhoods have been
disproportionately impacted by foreclosures and that this reflects the higher incidence of
higher-risk products received by these groups”); Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial
Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 644–46 (2010)
(finding a higher number and rate of foreclosures in metropolitan areas where there is a large
degree of Hispanic and especially black segregation); Andrew Haughwout et al., Subprime
Mortgage Pricing: The Impact of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender on the Cost of Borrowing,
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF., 2009, at 33, 33–35; Gregory D. Squires et
al., Segregation and the Subprime Lending Crisis 2–4 (Apr. 16, 2009) (Presented at the 2009
Federal Reserve System Community Affairs Research Conference), available at http://
www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/events/community/2009carc/Hyra.pdf (concluding that racial
segregation, especially among African Americans, is a significant predictor of metropolitanlevel variation in the proportion of subprime lending).
101. See PEW HEALTH GRP., STILL WAITING: “UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE” CREDIT CARD
PRACTICES CONTINUE AS AMERICANS WAIT FOR NEW REFORMS TO TAKE EFFECT (2009),
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health insurers’ claims denial data allowed the California Nurses’ Association to
call attention to the fact that the state’s six largest insurers rejected nearly one out
of every five claims they received during the first half of 2009.102 This effort, in
turn, prompted the state attorney general to open an investigation into the claims
payment practices of the state’s largest insurers.103
To be sure, market intermediaries may be able to facilitate smart disclosure or
promote market and regulatory discipline even in the absence of full disclosure
by conducting independent studies or surveys.104 But this is often not possible, as
it may be quite costly for market watchdogs to obtain the information necessary
to conduct such work. Indeed, information revealing potential market problems
will often be difficult to come by precisely because firms will tend to avoid making
such information easily accessible.105 Simply reducing the cost of gathering information by standardizing its format and availability can have dramatic effects
on the capacity of intermediaries to make use of that information.106 In any
event, public access to market information and data is generally most efficiently
facilitated by a single regulatory body, which can specify the format, content, and
location of this data.
II.

INADEQUACY OF TRANSPARENCY REGULATION IN
PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE

Despite the ubiquity of transparency-oriented regulation in most consumer
protection domains, such regulation is surprisingly absent or lackluster in state insurance regulation. In order to substantiate this claim, this Part focuses on five
central regulatory issues in property/casualty insurance markets: (1) prompt and

102.

103.
104.
105.
106.

http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Credit_Cards/Pew_Credit_
Cards_Oct09_Final.pdf.
Press Release, Cal. Nurses Ass’n/Nat’l Nurses Organizing Comm., California’s Real Death Panels:
Insurers Deny 21% of Claims (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/
02/idUS202570+02-Sep-2009+PRN20090902. Recently, Vermont passed a similar law
making claims denial information more available to the public. This, in turn, prompted
media attention to disparities in claims denial rates of different carriers. See Andrew Stein,
New Disclosures Show MVP Denied 15.5 Percent of Patient Claims in 2012; Blue Cross Denied
7.6 Percent, VTDIGGER.ORG (Mar. 20, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://vtdigger.org/2013/03/20/
new-disclosures-show-mvp-denied-15-5-percent-of-patient-claims-in-2012-blue-crossdenied-7-6-percent.
Lisa Girion, HMO Claims-Rejection Rates Triggers State Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/sep/04/business/fi-insure4.
See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 3, at 731–33.
See Schwarcz, supra note 7.
See Thaler & Tucker, supra note 37, at 55 (describing how simply making available online
details of 401(k) plans empowered one intermediary, Brightscope, to increase its rating
efforts substantially, with dramatic impacts on 401(k) providers more generally).

414

61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014)

accurate payment of claims, (2) coverage that is consistent with consumers’ reasonable expectations, (3) availability of insurance products for low-income and
minority populations, (4) objectivity of independent insurance agents, and (5) affordability of coverage. In each case, state insurance regulation either completely
forgoes transparency-oriented regulatory tools or relies on clearly inadequate
transparency-oriented rules. And, in each case, relatively simple transparencyfocused reforms could substantially improve regulation designed to address the
underlying concern. This Part also demonstrates that other spheres of financial
regulation have in recent years adopted effective and targeted transparencyoriented strategies when faced with analogous problems. In advancing this final
claim, this Part looks to consumer banking products—particularly mortgages,
credit cards, and student loans—which raise some similar regulatory issues to
property/casualty insurance. It also uses federal regulation of health insurance
markets as a foil, demonstrating the remarkable disconnect between this federally
dominated form of insurance regulation and the state-based regulation of property/casualty insurance.
A.

Full Disclosure of Claims Payment Practices

One of the fundamental risks of property/casualty insurance is the prospect
of insurer opportunism in claims payment. This risk arises because policyholders
perform routinely by paying premiums, whereas the insurer performs by paying a
claim if, and only if, a covered loss occurs.107 As a result, an insurer may be able to
retain premium payments even though it adopts an excessively aggressive stance
on paying claims, particularly when they are very large. Moreover, the complexity
and abstractness of typical property/casualty insurance policies means that it is often unclear whether a loss is indeed covered.108 Consequently, policyholders may
be unable to identify excessively restrictive claims practices even when they occur.
Insurers who are inclined to take advantage of these facts can deny or delay payment knowing that policyholders may fail to challenge coverage denials or may be
eager to settle because they have an immediate need for funds.109
For these reasons, protecting insurance consumers from unfair or delayed
claims resolutions is a central goal of insurance law and regulation. Every state
107. See, e.g., Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in Order to Avoid

Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims-Made Formats as a Test Case, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 505, 578–
88 (1999).
108. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 174, 180–81 (1986).
109. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British
and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735 (2009).

Transparently Opaque

415

has enacted broad laws protecting consumers from opportunistic claims handling, typically using the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’s
(NAIC)110 Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act as a template.111 Preventing
insurers from unreasonably refusing to pay or delaying claims payments is also a
central concern of various insurance law doctrines, particularly rules governing
bad faith.112
Despite the importance of ensuring prompt and accurate claims payment in
property/casualty insurance, state insurance law does not make publicly available,
much less require disclosure to consumers of, any insurer-specific information regarding insurers’ claims-paying reliability or promptness. This is true even
though the vast majority of states currently collect data from individual automobile and homeowners insurers regarding their claims payment practices through
the Market Conduct Annual Statement (MCAS).113 These data elements include how often claims are paid within specified time periods, how often claims
are denied, and how often policyholders sue for coverage.114 The NAIC aggregates and stores this data, maintaining and updating standardized definitions for
individual data elements.
The public unavailability of this or similar data is largely attributable to industry resistance. In 2008, the Market Conduct and Consumer Affairs Committee of the NAIC proposed publicly disclosing some of this data.115 Organizing
through numerous trade groups, the industry successfully undermined the proposal through a massive lobbying campaign.116 Its primary argument was that the
110. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is a voluntary association of

111.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

state insurance regulators that wields tremendous influence in insurance regulation through
various mechanisms, including the drafting of model laws and regulations. See Susan
Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629–34, 667–69 (1999).
NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 900-1 (1997), http://www.
naic.org/store/free/MDL-900.pdf. These laws are enforced through generalized market
conduct examinations as well as targeted investigations prompted by market conduct data or
consumer complaints. See generally KATHLEEN HEALD ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE
INSURANCE REGULATION 103 (1995) (discussing private regulation of claims activities).
See Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
405 (1996).
See Market Conduct Annual Statement Participating Jurisdictions, NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naic.org/industry_mcas_states (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MARKET CONDUCT ANNUAL STATEMENT:
HOMEOWNERS (2011), http://www.naic.org/documents/industry_mcas_data_collection_2011_
homeowners.pdf.
See NAIC MARKET REGULATION & CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMM., PROPOSAL FOR
CENTRALIZED DATA COLLECTION (2008).
See Chad Hemenway, NCOIL Study Expanded to Address NAIC Market Conduct Plan,
BESTWIRE, July 11, 2008, available at http://annuitynews.com/Article/NCOIL-StudyExpanded-to-Address-NAIC-Market-Conduct-Plan/96178; Letter from Am. Health Ins.
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underlying data should be considered confidential because it could reveal proprietary information. Formal NAIC minutes regarding the issue indicate that the
NAIC agreed to spend a year to “determine whether, and to what extent, the data
collected would be confidential or be available to the public.”117 But since that
time it has been assumed by virtually the entire regulatory community that
MCAS data is confidential, and the issue has never, in fact, been revisited.
Although the NAIC does not make available any insurer-specific market
conduct data, it recently began publicly releasing aggregate industry MCAS data
for individual states. The data reveals that there are substantial variations among
individual carriers with respect to various data elements. For instance, in Ohio,
the average homeowner carrier in 2009 closed approximately 21 percent of
claims without payment. But approximately 20 percent of the 150 reporting carriers closed more than 30 percent of claims without payment, including four carriers that closed more than half of their policyholders’ claims without payment.118
Similarly, in Kansas, approximately 19 percent of claims associated with private
automobile insurance were not paid within sixty days of being reported.119 But
for approximately 20 percent of the 120 reporting carriers, more than 30 percent
of claims took more than sixty days to pay, with one carrier reporting that 80 percent of its claims took more than sixty days to pay, and another carrier reporting
that 60 percent of its claims fell within this category. Unfortunately, consumers
in these states have no ability to tell which insurers fall in which categories and
thus cannot adjust their purchasing behavior accordingly.
Consumer complaint information—the only information that state insurance regulators make available to consumers that has any bearing on claims paying reliability—does very little to ameliorate these concerns. Most states, as well
as the NAIC, make consumer complaint information available on their websites,
though insurers need not disclose this information directly to consumers.120 And

117.
118.
119.
120.

Plans et al. to Sandy Praeger, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (May 27, 2008); see also
Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer Insurance
Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723, 734 (2009). See generally James Connolly, NAIC Insurer
Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insurers, PROP. CASUALTY 360° (Sept. 25, 2008), http://
www.propertycasualty360.com/2008/09/25/naic-insurer-conduct-data-scheme-riles-insurers
(stating “[i]ndustry representatives from major insurance trade groups . . . slammed the vote”).
Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Joint Executive Committee, Plenary, 2008 NAIC PROC. 3RD
QTR., 3–1, 3–8 (Sept. 22, 2008).
OHIO DEP’T OF INS., MARKET CONDUCT ANNUAL STATEMENT—HOMEOWNER
DATA (2009), http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Company/MC/2010/HOrc3.pdf.
KAN. INS. DEP’T, 2009 PROPERTY & CASUALTY MARKET CONDUCT ANNUAL STATEMENT 1
(on file with author).
According to a 2010 resources report, only six states do not make this data publicly available.
This data is collected by individual states and then reported and aggregated by the NAIC, which
maintains an online tool allowing users to view various complaint ratios for individual carriers. See
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the majority of such complaints do indeed concern claims handling.121 This data,
however, is generally limited and inconsistent. Most aggrieved consumers never
complain to their state’s insurance department. And the rate at which consumers
do complain is based on numerous factors, including the willingness of companies to direct unsatisfied consumers to state insurance departments or the average
affluence of policyholders, which tends to correlate with willingness to complain.122 MCAS claims data are not subject to any of these limitations, though
they of course have their own limitations.123
Even apart from the limitations in the underlying data, state regulators currently report consumer complaint data in a manner that substantially limits its
meaning. First, consumer complaints in many states and at the NAIC are reported only if the state insurance regulator confirms them.124 Among all complaints reported to the NAIC, approximately 73 percent are not confirmed and
thus never publicly reported.125 Second, and even more importantly, consumer
complaints are reported by individual insurance companies rather than by the insurance groups with which consumers are familiar, such as Allstate and State
Farm.126 As a result, a consumer interested in the complaint ratio for a specific
insurance group, such as Allstate, would be directed to potentially dozens of different insurance companies, all of which have different complaint numbers. Unless the searcher (1) was already a policyholder and had been assigned a specific
insurance company, and (2) understood the distinction between insurance groups
and companies, this information would prove almost impossible to decipher.

121.
122.

123.

124.
125.
126.

Consumer Information Source, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, https://eapps.naic.org/cis (last
visited Nov. 21, 2013).
Schwarcz, supra note 109, at 751.
See, e.g., J.P. Liefeld et al., Demographic Characteristics of Canadian Consumer Complainers, 9 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 73 (1975); Joseph Barry Mason & Samuel H. Himes, Jr., An Exploratory
Behavioral and Socio-Economic Profile of Consumer Action About Dissatisfaction With Selected
Household Appliances, 7 J. CONSUMER AFF. 121 (1973).
Market Conduct Annual Statement (MCAS) data are evidently reliable enough that
regulators use them to guide their market conduct priorities. But no data are perfect;
insurance regulators would indeed be well served by collecting better and more fine-grained
data. In particular, state insurance regulators should move towards collecting transactionlevel data, of insurance transactions rather than summary data such as the MCAS.
See, e.g., REASONS WHY CLOSED CONFIRMED CONSUMER COMPLAINTS WERE
REPORTED AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 (2013), available at https://eapps.naic.org/
documents/cis_aggregate_complaints_by_reason_codes.pdf.
In using complaint information to identify market problems, regulators themselves look at
both total complaints and confirmed complaints. See 1 NAIC, MARKET REGULATION
HANDBOOK 25–27 (2009).
Each insurance group typically has numerous insurance companies, each licensed to do
business in a different state. Even within a state, an insurance group may have multiple
insurance companies (for example, Allstate Indemnity Company, Allstate Insurance Company, and
Allstate Property and Casualty Company).
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These deficiencies in consumer complaint information become even more
apparent when contrasted with analogous federal regulatory efforts. First, consider the regulation of claims payment data in the federally regulated health insurance sphere. As with property/casualty insurance regulation, the vast majority
of states did not make publicly available health insurers’ claims payment rates before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).127 But even before
the ACA, quasiregulatory bodies with a federal reach, such as the American
Medical Association (AMA), published information on the timeliness, transparency, and accuracy of claims processing by the nation’s largest health insurance
companies.128 Given the obvious limitations of relying on such quasiregulation,
the ACA will make such disclosure a formal regulatory requirement in 2014.129
This data on carriers’ claims payments must be provided in plain language that
consumers can readily understand and use.130
Similarly, the CFPB’s database on consumer complaints for credit cards reveals the inadequacies of state consumer complaint reporting in property/casualty
insurance.131 In that database, consumer complaint information is reported by
the brand names of credit card companies, rather than by company subsidiaries or
product types. Moreover, the CFPB includes complaints in the database regardless
of whether they are considered “confirmed,” leaving it to the “marketplace of ideas”
to determine what the data show.132 As the CFPB notes, “[s]o long as consumers
are aware of the limitations of the data, there is little or no reason to believe that
complaint data should make the market less informed and transparent.”133 Shortly
after the CFPB launched this database, various media outlets reported on it, noting

127. California has collected data on health-insurer claims denials since 2002. See CAL. HEALTH

128.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.

& SAFETY CODE § 1367.03(f)(2) (West 2008). In 2010, the Connecticut legislature
approved a bill mandating the reporting of certain health-insurance claims denial data. See
2010 Conn. Acts 170–73 (Reg. Sess.).
National Health Insurer Report Card, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
advocacy/topics/administrative-simplification-initiatives/national-health-insurer-report-card.page?
(last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) will also require insurers participating in
state insurance exchanges to publicly disclose “[c]laims payment policies and practices[,] . . .
[d]ata on the number of claims that are denied[,] . . . [and] [o]ther information as determined
appropriate by the Secretary.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 18031(e)(3)(A) (Supp. 2011).
Id. § 18031(3)(e)(B).
Credit Card Complaints, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://data.consumerfinance
.gov/dataset/Credit-Card-Complaints/25ei-6bcr (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
The CFBP does, however, maintain significant controls to authenticate complaints. See Disclosure of
Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558, 37,561–62 (June 22, 2012).
See id. at 37,562.
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that Capital One had the highest number of consumer complaints.134 More recently, an academic analysis used this database to identify specific banks that “were
significantly less timely in responding to consumer complaints than the average financial institution,” “were significantly more likely than average to dispute the
company‘s response to their initial complaints,” and “received more mortgage complaints relative to mortgages sold than other banks.”135
If insurance regulators invested time and resources in publicly releasing
quality, carrier-specific data regarding different carriers’ claims payment practices, their regulatory efforts would be much more efficient and effective. Currently,
the only publicly available information about carriers’ claims-paying practices
comes from personal anecdotes and highly imperfect consumer surveys.136 The
public release of detailed and specific MCAS data, by contrast, would dramatically alter this landscape. Such full disclosure would empower market watchdogs
to communicate more accurately to consumers the quality of different carriers’
claims practices.137 Full disclosure could also improve the capacity of independent insurance agents, consumer magazines, and market intermediaries using
smart disclosure to more accurately direct consumers to carriers according to the
consumer’s desired mix of claims service and price.138 Further, the mere threat of
these forces could well alter insurers’ calculus of how best to pay claims.
Importantly, all these potential benefits would complement current regulatory and judicial efforts to prevent unfair claims practices. But rather than simply
relying on occasional bad-faith cases and vastly overstretched state regulators for
enforcement of these efforts, this approach would harness market forces to induce
carriers to do a better job of paying claims fairly and promptly.139 Moreover, un134. Alwyn Scott & Rick Rothacker, Consumer Bureau Discloses Credit-Card Complaints, CHI.

135.
136.

137.
138.
139.

TRIB., June 19, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-19/business/sns-rt-ususa-creditcards-complaintsbre85j03w-20120619_1_credit-card-complaints-complaintdatabase-consumer-bureau (“‘Making credit card complaints public will put added pressure
on banks to avoid unfair practices and help consumers make more informed financial
decisions,’ said Pamela Banks, senior policy counsel for Consumers Union, in a statement.”).
For one recent example of this phenomenon, consider Ayres et al., supra note 88.
See id.; see also Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007). Some, but not all, states do make
market-conduct exams of particular companies publicly available. But accessing these reports
is quite difficult, as there is no centralized location for these reports. More importantly, a
substantial number of market conduct reports are not released because they are sealed
pursuant to settlement between regulators and companies. This means that the exams that
are released represent a biased and incomplete sample. Schwarcz, supra.
See supra Part I.B, Transparency, Full Disclosure, and Market Discipline.
Schwarcz, supra note 116.
Cf. Tom Baker, Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395
(1994) (arguing “insurance companies tell stories about insurance that courts can use (and
implicitly have used) as a source for the ‘unwritten’ obligations of the insurance relationship”).
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like either judicial or regulatory scrutiny, this approach could facilitate consumer
choice about the tradeoff between premiums and claims handling quality. Finally, it could generate pressure on regulators to better police outlier carriers who
adopt particularly aggressive claims-handling practices.140
B.

Coverage Consistent with Consumers’ Reasonable Expectations
1.

Improving Consumer Understanding of Coverage

A core concern of insurance law and regulation is that consumers’ actual coverage matches their reasonable expectations of that coverage. On the regulatory
side, states require that carriers’ policies comply with various specific coverage mandates. They also typically require that carriers’ policies not be “unfair, ambiguous,
unreasonable, or contrary to public policy.”141 In most states, enforcement of these
rules in personal lines of coverage occurs through “prior approval” form review,
meaning that the relevant insurance regulator must specifically approve carriers’
policy documents before they are used in the market place.142 Judicial doctrines also
serve to promote consumers’ reasonable expectations of coverage. Indeed, one of
the most controversial doctrines of insurance law is specifically designed to validate
consumers’ objectively reasonable expectations of coverage notwithstanding policy
language tending to negate those expectations.143
Despite the importance of ensuring that coverage matches consumers’ reasonable expectations, state insurance law and regulation does remarkably little to
promote consumers’ understanding of coverage. Perhaps most strikingly, no state
requires any type of summary disclosure regarding the terms of coverage to be delivered to consumers before, or at the time of, purchase. And only a small minority
of states require summary disclosure of policy terms at the time of policy delivery,
which is usually two-to-three weeks after purchase.144 NAIC model rules or laws
also do not require any form of summary coverage disclosure.145

140. See Schwarcz, supra note 109.
141. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1276.
142. See Stephen P. D’Arcy, Insurance Price Deregulation: The Illinois Experience, in DEREGULATING

PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING
MARKET EFFICIENCY, supra note 17, at 248, 256–58.
143. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV.
961, 967 (1970). The dominant interpretive meme of insurance law—the ambiguity rule—can
also be justified at least in part as a mechanism to promote consumers’ reasonable expectations of
coverage. Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV.
531, 547–50 (1996).
144. Several states require insurers to disclose at the time of policy delivery (which is several weeks after
purchase) that the policy contains certain exclusions, such as for damages caused by flood or

Transparently Opaque

421

Instead, in the vast majority of states, the only description of coverage that
insurers must provide to consumers is the insurance contract itself, which is typically a twenty- to forty-page document that includes various amendatory endorsements. To be sure, most states do require policies to meet a specific
quantitative readability score, usually a fifty or forty on the Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease Score.146 Additionally, they often require that the policies contain a table of contents and “self-contained and independent” sections, be written in no
less than ten point font, and “use everyday, conversational language.”147
But these rules are inadequate at promoting real consumer understanding of
policy coverage. First, providing consumers with information several weeks after
purchase—whether through a policy document itself or through a summary disclosure—will not promote the regulatory goal of ensuring coverage that consumers reasonably expect because consumers do not receive the relevant information
when they actually need it.148 Consumers have virtually no incentive to read these
documents once they have already settled on an insurance carrier and policy, par-

145.
146.

147.
148.

earthquake. See 702 DEL. CODE REGS. § 5 (LexisNexis 2013) (flood); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:15.5 (2013) (flood); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3444 (McKinney 2007) (mudslide or flood). In Colorado,
insurers issuing dwelling fire insurance, homeowners insurance, or auto insurance must have on file
for public inspection a summary disclosure form that contains a simple explanation of the major
coverages and exclusions of its policies, as well as a recitation of general factors considered in
cancellation, nonrenewal, and increase in premium situations. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-111
(2012). Delaware also requires insurers to offer various other disclosures regarding matters such as
replacement cost settlement, policy limits, and nonrenewal. Alaska requires that if an auto insurance
policy does not include mandated liability coverage, the insurer must disclose that fact in boldface
type at the time of policy delivery. ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.465 (2012). Several states mandate some
summary disclosures pertaining to rental car insurance. For instance, in Kentucky, rental vehicle
insurance may not be sold unless certain disclosures are made in writing and included with the rental
vehicle agreement. The disclosures must include a clear and concise description of the material terms
and conditions of the coverage, including a description of exclusions and a statement that the
coverage offered may be duplicative of coverage already provided by the renter’s personal automobile
insurance policy. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.9-509 (LexisNexis 2011). In Maine, comprehensive personal auto insurance must cover rental vehicles, and that fact must be disclosed to
consumers in a notice accompanying the policy at the time of issuance. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24-A, § 2927 (West 2000). Many states do require event disclosures whereby policy terms must
be disclosed on the occurrence of a certain event, such as a policy claim.
One exception applies when insurance is sold through an employer or affinity group,
something that is very uncommon in the property/casualty context. NAIC MODEL LAWS,
REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 710-2, § 10 (1997).
See Public Hearing on Insurance Contract Readability Standards Before the NAIC
Consumer Connections Working Group for the Public Hearing on Insurance Contract
Readability Standards (Mar. 2010) (testimony of Brenda Cude, Prof. of Hous. & Consumer
Econ., Univ. of Ga.) (on file with author).
See NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 732-1 (1997), available at
http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-732.pdf.
See supra Part I.A.1, Summary Disclosures (discussing the importance of timing disclosures
correctly); see also Korobkin, supra note 42, at 1226; Schwarcz, supra note 109.
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ticularly because switching carriers after purchase is difficult and costly.149 Moreover, many consumers may have trouble recalling and making use of the basic
insurance knowledge and terminology they learned when making the initial purchase several weeks earlier.150
Using the insurance policy itself as a disclosure is also inconsistent with the
other two best practices of disclosure described in Part I: (1) providing limited information and (2) using a uniform and tested template. Even motivated consumers are ill-equipped to comprehend the meaning of typical property/casualty
policies, which are, in many ways, uniquely impenetrable.151 Flesch-Kincaid and
other readability requirements do little to remedy this problem. Not only are the
required scores well above the reading level of most Americans, but these scores do
not reflect the length of the underlying document, its organization or formatting,
or the extent to which words are put together in logical and clear sentences.152
These inadequacies are only partially mitigated by the various buyers’ guides
and consumer advisories that regulators produce. The NAIC maintains and
makes publicly available an extensive array of consumer financial education on insurance, including buyers’ guides that describe coverage in generic terms and provide some useful background and helpful questions to ask insurance agents.153
Unfortunately, these attempts at financial literacy education suffer from two serious flaws, even apart from the more general inadequacies in consumer financial
education.154 First, not only are these materials not provided “just in time”155 but
most consumers never actually see them at all: Insurers and agents are not usually
required to make these documents available to consumers in property/casualty
markets, and they are instead buried in frequently hard-to-find links on state in-

149. See Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine?: The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts, 21 RAND

J. ECON. 518 (1990).
150. See supra Part I.A.2, Financial Literacy Education (discussing just-in-time financial education).
151. See Schwarcz, supra note 7. See generally Michelle E. Boardman, Allure of Ambiguous

152.
153.

154.
155.

Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2006) (quoting a recent South Carolina
Supreme Court decision as stating that “[a]mbiguity and incomprehensibility seem to be the
favorite tools of the insurance trade in drafting policies”).
See Public Hearing on Insurance Contract Readability Standards Before the NAIC Consumer
Connections Working Group for the Public Hearing on Insurance Contract Readability
Standards, supra note 146 (testimony of Daniel Schwarcz, Brenda Cude, and Amy Bach).
The NAIC also runs a website, “InsureU,” that aims to educate consumers about various
insurance issues. See INSUREU, http://www.insureuonline.org (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
In addition to these efforts, various states also maintain generic descriptions of different
insurance lines of coverage on their websites and in informational brochures.
See supra Part I.A.3, Antifraud and Antideception Rules.
See supra Part I.A.3, Antifraud and Antideception Rules.
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surance department websites. Second, with remarkably few exceptions,156 these
materials are completely generic: They provide consumers with absolutely no
carrier- or consumer-specific guidance. In many cases, consumers would be better off simply Google searching the desired coverage line than reading the relevant buyers’ guide.
The collective inadequacy of these regulatory efforts is put into sharp relief
when they are compared to federal efforts to inform consumers about the key
terms of complex financial contracts. For instance, consider the CFPB summary
disclosure form for mortgages.157 This document is a three-page disclosure that
is standardized across the industry in format, design, and information but that is
personalized to the borrower’s particular loan. The disclosure form provides the
most important information on the first page, is written using simple and accessible words, and is given to consumers before they agree to the terms of a mortgage—at least three business days before closing on the loan.158 The CFPB has
extensively tested the document itself with consumers through focus groups, consumer surveys, and the broad solicitation of consumer feedback online.159
Perhaps an even more compelling comparison that reveals the inadequacies
of property/casualty disclosure rules is provided by the ACA’s disclosure regime
for health insurance policies. ACA requires the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), in consultation with the NAIC, to develop a uniform
“summary of benefits and coverage” that would not exceed four pages, would utilize uniform definitions, and would provide consumers with a broad description
of key coverage terms, cost-sharing requirements, and exclusions.160 State regulators, operating through the NAIC pursuant to a federal legislative command and
needing to prove themselves to federal regulators, did an admirable job of devel-

156. The one exception is that one state, Texas, maintains a very good online tool that provides
157.

158.

159.
160.

consumers with summary information regarding the content of individual carriers’
homeowners policies. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1334–35.
A sample of the Loan Estimate disclosure form created by the CFPB is available at Loan Estimate,
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_loanestimate.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). See generally Disclosure Comparison, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/compare (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PROPOSED RULE TO SIMPLIFY AND IMPROVE
MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE FORMS (2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_
cfpb_consumer-summary_proposed-rule-to-improve-mortgage-disclosure.pdf (commenting
on proposed disclosures).
Kennedy et al., supra note 28.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15 (Supp. 2011) (adding Section 2715 to the Public Health Service Act).
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oping such a document.161 State regulators subjected the document to extensive
consumer testing and repeatedly refined it in response to the results of that testing.162 As a result, it clearly communicates the central terms of a health-insurance
policy in a standardized format with which consumers will become increasingly
familiar and that will tend to facilitate comparison shopping and market discipline.
State regulators could easily devise an analogous document for property/casualty insurance policies. The document would likely focus consumers’ attention on key exclusions for which supplemental coverage could be purchased as
well as on the coverage limit, which generally must be sufficient to rebuild in the
event of a total loss.163 It would highlight whether claims are paid out according
to actual cash value (ACV) or replacement. And it might also focus consumers’
attention on exclusions that are intended to reduce moral hazard—the risk that
policyholders will take insufficient care because they are insured.164 Additionally,
an effective disclosure would convey, in summary form, a metric of the extent to
which the underlying policy was more or less generous than the presumptive industry baseline, the relevant Insurance Services Office (ISO) policy.165 Except in
the increasingly rare instances when consumers purchase coverage over the
phone, insurers could easily provide this summary disclosure to consumers well
before the purchase of the underlying coverage and maintain online access to the
disclosure as well.166
Such a summary disclosure form could (albeit imperfectly) promote coverage that is more consistent with consumers’ reasonable expectations if it were delivered to consumers before purchase and made widely available online. It could
encourage market discipline by penalizing firms that decrease coverage to consumers in ways that their prices do not reflect. It could also better match consumers
with insurance providers by allowing consumers to select intelligently among available price/coverage combinations. To be sure, how well such a document would
161. The proposed template is available online. Summary of Benefits and Coverage: What This Plan Covers
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

& What It Costs, DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/correctedsbctemplate.pdf (last updated
May 11, 2012).
See CONSUMERS UNION, WHAT’S BEHIND THE DOOR: CONSUMERS’ DIFFICULTIES
SELECTING HEALTH PLANS (2012), http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/pdf/Consumer%
20Difficulties%20Selecting%20Health%20Plans%20Jan%202012.pdf.
Kenneth S. Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market Inefficiencies in the Purchase
and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 345, 378–82 (2011).
See Schwarcz, supra note 109.
See id.
The two dominant ways that consumers purchase coverage are over the Internet or in person, with
an agent. See MCKINSEY & CO., AGENTS OF THE FUTURE: THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY
AND CASUALTY INSURANCE DISTRIBUTION 6 (2013). In either case, there is simply no
technical barrier to requiring that consumers receive relevant disclosure material before
purchase.
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accomplish these goals is an empirical question that would depend crucially on
the quality of the disclosure.167 But, this approach could easily be paired with current regulatory approaches to promote coverage consistent with consumers’ reasonable expectations, such as coverage mandates and policy preapproval.
Additionally, better disclosure of policy terms could yield benefits that are
simply impossible to replicate through the traditional command-and-control approach to ensuring adequate coverage. In particular, it could promote effective
usage of insurance by consumers by limiting the risk of moral hazard: While
many insurance contract exclusions are aimed at losses that are particularly likely
to be the product of insufficient care, these provisions work only if policyholders
are aware of them.168 If these clauses fail to reduce moral hazard risk and simply
shift this risk to policyholders, they produce two independent social costs: They
fail to minimize costs efficiently, and they allocate those costs to the comparatively risk-averse party.
2.

Full Disclosure of Carriers’ Coverages

Not only does state insurance regulation fail to promote effective summary
disclosure to consumers, but it also fails to promote full disclosure to the public.169
It is currently incredibly difficult for entrepreneurial intermediaries, motivated
consumers, interested academics, consumer advocates, and inquiring news outlets
to acquire copies of different property/casualty insurers’ policy documents.170
Almost no insurers make these documents publicly available online.171 Nor do
state insurance regulators systematically maintain copies of different carriers’ policies. The copies states happen to have on file generally must be accessed either
through a freedom-of-information request or by physically visiting the regulator,
locating the relevant documents, and photocopying them.172 And even with respect to the small handful of states that facilitate online access to regulatory fil-

167. See supra Part I.A, An Overview of Transparency-Oriented Consumer Financial Protection.
168. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1308.
169. See supra Part I.B, Transparency, Full Disclosure, and Market Discipline (explaining the

distinct value of full disclosure of information to the public).
170. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1318–37 (emphasizing the various barriers to obtain-

ing policy forms).
171. Id. at 1321 (“An information-seeking consumer might first look to insurers’ websites to

access copies of policy forms. A thorough review of these websites reveals that such an effort
would be fruitless: not a single one of the top twenty homeowners insurers in the nation
makes their homeowners policies available online.”). Exceptions include California, Florida
(property and casualty), Indiana (health and life), Pennsylvania, and Washington.
172. See Elizabeth Abbott et al., Comments of NAIC Consumer Representatives Regarding Leveraging
SERFF in Support of Public Access to Product Filings (2012) (on file with author).
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ings, actually using these tools to retrieve available policy forms takes many hours
of effort as well as substantial technical expertise.173
Once again, these inadequacies contrast sharply with analogous efforts at
transparency in the federal sphere. For instance, the Credit CARD Act requires
credit card issuers to publish on the Internet their cardholder contracts.174 These
contracts are easily searchable on a single website that is specifically designed for
ease of use.175 Similarly, the ACA requires that all health insurance policies be
made publicly available on the Internet, along with information about a carrier’s
list of network providers and drug formularies.176
There is good reason to think that making insurance policies more widely
available online would meaningfully improve market transparency. In the United
Kingdom, insurers’ policies are widely available online, usually through the insurer’s own website.177 Using this information, the primary consumer-oriented
magazine in the United Kingdom ranks, each year, every insurance carrier based
in part on a thorough analysis of the terms of each carrier’s insurance policy.178 It
also has developed a standardized mechanism to inform consumers of each carrier’s terms, which discloses both the “[m]ost important policy elements” and, with
a click of the mouse, various additional terms.179 Similarly, market intermediaries
in Germany provide independent product ratings of different insurers’ policies.180
C.

Full Disclosure of the Availability of Insurance Products for Low-Income
and Minority Populations

A major regulatory goal in the homeowners insurance arena is to ensure the
availability of coverage for low-income and minority populations. The reason is

173. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1325.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (2012) (codifying § 204 of the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility

and Disclosure Act of 2009).
175. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, 15 U.S.C. § 1632(d).
176. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1303, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 168 (2010).
177. See, e.g., ECCLESIASTICAL, POLICY DOCUMENT: HOME INSURANCE (2013), http://www.

ecclesiastical.com/Images/home%20insurance%20policy%20document.pdf; LEGAL & GEN.,
HOME INSURANCE: POLICY BOOKLET (2013), http://www.legalandgeneral.com/_resources/
pdfs/insurance/HomePolicy.pdf; Home Insurance Cover, HISCOX, http://www.hiscox.co.uk/
personal-and-home/home-insurance/details-of-cover (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
178. See Home Insurance: Which? Recommended Providers, WHICH?, http://www.which.co.uk/
money/insurance/reviews-ns/home-insurance/which-recommended-providers (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
179. See, e.g., Home Insurance Reviews—Hiscox Home Insurance Review, WHICH?, http://www.
which.co.uk/money/insurance/reviews-ns/home-insurance-reviews/hiscox-home-insurancereview (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
180. See Stephanie Meyr & Sharon Tennyson, Product Ratings as a Market Reaction to Deregulation:
Evidence From Germany (Sept. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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simple: Homeowners insurance is a practical prerequisite for homeownership because lenders require that borrowers purchase and maintain coverage. As one
court succinctly put it: “No insurance, no loan; no loan, no house; lack of insurance thus makes housing unavailable.”181 This concern gained substantial attention several decades ago when various insurers refused to sell coverage within
“redlined” low-income and minority regions.182 Available evidence suggests that
homeowners insurance continues to be systematically more expensive and less
available in certain low-income, urban areas.183 Even in the absence of discriminatory intent, facially neutral insurance practices producing these results may violate the Fair Housing Act if a less discriminatory alternative is available.184
According to a recent report, similar availability problems are common for
automobile insurance.185 In particular, facially neutral rating criteria—including
credit score, education, and occupation—systematically make comparable insurance more expensive for low-income individuals than their wealthier counterparts. Moreover, coverage is often less available in low-income regions
because of the absence of insurance agents. And in some cases, carriers simply refuse to sell coverage to low-income drivers in certain geographic regions. These
findings raise distinct problems: The unavailability of automobile insurance often
means that low-income individuals cannot commute to work, locate new job opportunities, or easily acquire needed goods at affordable prices.186 Moreover,
availability problems result in a more substantial population of uninsured drivers,
which jeopardizes larger state goals of reasonable compensation for accident victims.

181. NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 297–98 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing

Cartwright v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 880 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1989)).
182. See generally GREGORY SQUIRES, INSURANCE REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT,
AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1997).

183. See generally Gregory D. Squires, Racial Profiling, Insurance Style: Insurance Redlining and the

Uneven Development of Metropolitan Areas, 25 J. URB. AFF. 391 (2003). But see Scott E.
Harrington & Greg Niehaus, Race, Redlining, and Automobile Insurance Prices, 71 J. BUS. 439,
456 (1998) (finding in Missouri that racial discrimination does not produce prices that are
higher than expected claims costs in the context of automobile insurance).
184. Dana L. Kaersvang, Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in Homeowners
Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 2006–13 (2006).
185. Auto Insurers Charge High and Variable Rates for Minimum Coverage to Good Drivers From ModerateIncome Areas, CONSUMER FED’N AM. (June 18, 2012), http://www.consumerfed.org/news/545.
186. Cf. Steven Garasky et al., Transiting to Work: The Role of Private Transportation for LowIncome Households, 40 J. CONSUMER AFF. 64, 74 (2006) (noting that low-income
respondents are more likely to report that transportation problems affected training or labor
force participation because of lapses in insurance); Brian D. Taylor & Paul M. Ong, Spatial
Mismatch or Automobile Mismatch?: An Examination of Race, Residence and Commuting in U.S.
Metropolitan Areas, 32 URB. STUD. 1453, 1471 (1995) (“That commuters dependent on
public transit are at a distinct disadvantage in accessing employment, especially to dispersed
suburban job sites, points to policies to help carless job-seekers get access to automobiles.”).
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Despite these concerns, state insurance regulation has actively resisted making publicly available any information regarding the availability and affordability
of insurance in low-income and minority regions. The last survey on point found
that only four states require insurers to disclose any information regarding the
availability of homeowners insurance in specific geographic regions, and no state
makes publicly available geography-specific loss or pricing data for individual insurers.187 Similarly, the NAIC has no model laws or regulations requiring the
collection and dissemination of such data, and it has repeatedly ignored advocates’ efforts to promote such transparency.188 Systematic data is also lacking in
the automobile insurance realm. With the exception of a few states, particularly
California, state laws and regulations do not require the collection or dissemination of data regarding the availability of automobile insurance to low income and
minority populations.189
Full disclosure about the extent of availability and affordability problems
would likely increase regulator and carrier accountability for any coverage availability problems that do exist. Currently, much of the evidence on these issues is
anecdotal precisely because of the lack of relevant information. Academics, public interest groups, and journalists have been unable to document these problems
systematically, allowing regulators, lawmakers, and carriers to avoid public pressure to do anything about the underlying problems to the extent they exist in the
first place.190 By contrast, in those states that do disclose information about the
availability of coverage, public interest groups have had much more success in
pressing carriers to expand the availability of coverage through Fair Housing Act
lawsuits.191
Federal efforts to promote transparency in analogous domains suggest the
inadequacy of state insurance law and the potential benefits of a full disclosure regime in insurance. The HMDA requires most lenders to report and make publicly available geocoded information regarding home loans, loan applications,
interest rates, and the race, gender, and income of loan applicants.192 The
187. Squires, supra note 183, at 404.
188. See Gregory D. Squires, Bank Reform Offers Opportunity to Address Insurance Redlining,
189.

190.
191.
192.

HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2010, 12:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-dsquires/bank-reform-offers-opport_b_644542.html.
See Comments of the Consumer Federation of America and the Center for Economic Justice on
Proposed Work Plan of Joint Auto Insurance (C/D) Study Group (July 5, 2012), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_d_auto_insurance_study_group_exposures_work_
plan_auto_study_group_cej_cfa_comments.pdf. This might include data regarding average
premiums, normalized for coverage differences, for geographic areas sorted by income level.
See Squires, supra note 183, at 404.
See id.
See 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (2012); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203 (2013).
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HMDA has promoted a richer understanding of credit availability and discrimination, helped identify discriminatory lending practices, and prompted various
initiatives to make credit more available in traditionally underserved areas.193
In this instance, the inadequacy of state insurance regulation in promoting
transparency proved sufficiently clear that federal lawmakers recently intervened.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank) establishes a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) and specifically charges
it with “monitor[ing] the extent to which traditionally underserved communities
and consumers, minorities . . . and low- and moderate-income persons have access to affordable insurance products regarding all lines of insurance.”194 To do
so, the FIO can “receive and collect data and information on and from the insurance industry and insurers” and “analyze and disseminate [this] data and information.”195 In other words, only after state insurance law repeatedly refused to
make HMDA-like data for homeowners or automobile insurance publicly available did federal lawmakers step in and insist on this level of transparency, which
has long been a core feature of federal housing policy.
D. Improving Consumer Understanding of the Objectivity of Independent
Insurance Agents
Many property/casualty policyholders purchase their coverage through an
independent insurance agent. Such agents can write coverage with multiple different carriers, a fact that they claim allows them to better find a policy and company that matches consumers’ needs and preferences.196 But most independent
insurance agents also receive different amounts of compensation for placing consumers with different carriers.197 This can create a potential conflict of interest
for agents, as they may earn more by steering a policyholder to an insurer that is
not the best fit for that consumer.198

193. See sources cited supra note 100. Similarly, under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA),
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

regulators’ assessments of banks’ and thrifts’ lending records to low- and moderate-income
communities and the institutions’ CRA ratings are made public. See Barr, supra note 23, at 601.
31 U.S.C. § 313(a), (c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2011).
Id. § 313(e)(1)(A), (C).
See Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance
Marketing System, 39 J.L. & ECON. 637, 642 (1996); Schwarcz, supra note 116.
Often this is a result of “contingent commissions,” which are essentially year-end bonuses to
agents based on the volume and/or profitability of the business sent to the insurer.
Alternatively, some carriers may simply pay higher upfront “premium” commissions.
See Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 291 (2007).
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These issues have prompted substantial regulatory scrutiny in recent years.
High-profile investigations by the New York Attorney General revealed that the
leading commercial-insurance broker systematically steered its sophisticated clients to more expensive coverage, at times even orchestrating phony bids to do
so.199 Not surprisingly, evidence suggests that similar steering (though not bid
rigging) occurred at smaller independent insurance agencies as well.200 Insurance
agent steering undermines market discipline by focusing insurers on wooing insurance agents rather than on providing value to consumers.201 It also undermines the matching of consumers with products that best suit their needs.202
Despite these concerns, state insurance regulators have consistently refused
to promote disclosure to consumers about the compensation and incentives of ostensibly independent insurance agents. Most states do not currently have any
rules or regulations regarding the disclosure of agent compensation. Those that
do typically do not require any such disclosure unless the agent received compensation directly from the customer, which is highly atypical in most consumer
transactions.203 Only a single state, New York, requires that agents in ordinary
consumer transactions disclose before sale that their compensation may vary depending on the carrier with which the consumer is placed.204 And this disclosure
violates most of the basic principles for effective summary disclosure described
above: It does not require disclosure in a standardized format or template, it was
not consumer tested, it does not focus consumers on the key information, and it is
likely to be drowned out by other disclosures.205

199. See Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the Way to Insurance Market

Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3046–47 (2006).

200. See Jeffrey M. Wilder, Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent: Contingency Fees in
201.

202.
203.
204.

205.

Commercial Insurance 4–5 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Grp.
Working Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=418061.
Public Hearing on Producer Compensation: Hearing Before the N.Y. Ins. Dep’t & Office of the Att’y Gen.
116 (July 25, 2008) (testimony of Don Bailey, CEO, Willis North America), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/hearing/broker_comp_072008/br-cmp-tran-nyc.pdf (testifying that
Willis, a property/casualty insurance broker, does not accept contingent commissions because
they pose a “clear and obvious conflict of interest”).
Schwarcz, supra note 198.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 3063–64.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 30.3 (2010). Notably, this seemingly limited rule
prompted massive outcry and resistance from the industry, including a lawsuit claiming that
the rule was not within the Insurance Commissioner’s authority. See In re Sullivan Fin. Grp.,
Inc. v. Wrynn, 939 N.Y.S.2d 761 (App. Div. 2012).
See supra Part I, An Overview of Transparency-Oriented Consumer Financial Protection.
The disclosure should focus consumers on the fact that differential compensation creates a
conflict of interest for agents in recommending different carriers. Additionally, agents should
provide it when they cannot explain it away, and most importantly, such disclosure should be
consumer tested.
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Once again, this refusal of state regulators to embrace transparency contrasts
starkly with federal regulation of analogous conflicts of interest. For instance, until the Dodd-Frank Act banned the payment of yield spread premiums to mortgage originators,206 federal law required U.S. mortgage brokers to disclose these
payments, as well as all other forms of compensation, to borrowers within three
days of the borrower’s initial application as well as at the time of closing.207 Like
differential compensation to insurance agents, yield spread premiums created incentives for brokers to steer mortgage applicants to costly loans.208 Similarly, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires investment managers to disclose any
side payments that they receive from brokerage firms in the form of “soft dollars.”209 As above, these side payments create risks that investment managers will
select brokerage firms that are not in their clients’ best interests.210
To be sure, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the efficacy of transparencybased solutions to these types of regulatory problems, which Howell Jackson has
labeled “trilateral dilemmas.”211 Indeed, federal disclosure efforts in this context
have a poor record. The disclosure-based approach to yield spread premiums
seems to have been a failure, a fact implicitly recognized by the Dodd-Frank Act’s
move to ban these payments.212 And the effectiveness of soft dollar disclosures is
also unclear, with the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) Mutual
Fund Task Force having recommended “enhanced disclosure in fund prospectuses to foster better investor awareness of soft dollar practices.”213 Moreover, empirical research suggests that disclosures of conflicts of interest can backfire,
enhancing consumer trust of market intermediaries whom they credit with honesty and forthrightness and increasing the willingness of intermediaries to act on
their conflicts of interest.214

206. 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(4)(a) (2012).
207. Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread

Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 305–08 (2007).
208. See Howell Jackson, The Trilateral Dilemma in Financial Regulation, in OVERCOMING THE
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

214.

SAVING SLUMP: HOW TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION
AND SAVING PROGRAMS 82 (Annamaria Lusardi ed., 2008).
See generally Lee B. Burgunder & Karl O. Hartmann, Soft Dollars and Section 28(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A 1985 Perspective, 24 AM. BUS. L.J. 139 (1986).
See Schwarcz, supra note 198, at 313.
See Schwarcz, supra note 116; Schwarcz, supra note 198.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(4)(a) (2012).
MUT. FUND TASK FORCE, NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, REPORT OF THE MUTUAL
FUND TASK FORCE: SOFT DOLLARS AND PORTFOLIO TRANSACTION COSTS 5 (2004)
[hereinafter NASD TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/p012356.pdf.
See generally JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE
EFFECT OF MORTGAGE BROKER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND

432

61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014)

But in the absence of a complete ban on differential compensation to independent insurance agents, various transparency-based approaches could indeed
be partially effective. Perhaps the most promising such approach would be for insurance regulators to use insurance-based antideception rules to forbid agents
who receive differential compensation from describing themselves as independent. That word, which is heavily emphasized in the marketing materials of most
agents who place coverage with multiple carriers, conveys the impression that the
agent will work solely in the policyholder’s best interests. Differential compensation undermines this promise. By forcing agents who accept differential compensation to abandon their claims of independence, regulators could foster a
market-based approach to differential compensation whereby agents seeking to
appeal to consumers looking for genuine independence could disclaim differential compensation.215
E.

Affordable Insurance Rates and Improving Consumers’ Ability
to Comparison Shop

A major goal of state regulation of property/casualty insurance is to promote
affordable insurance rates. This goal, however, is quite controversial, with many
commentators arguing that there is little risk that carriers will charge excessive
rates in property/casualty markets because of market competition.216 This position should be resisted for two reasons. First, carriers’ actual coverage varies substantially in ways that are impossible for consumers to observe,217 and so the rate
per unit of coverage that any carrier charges is also difficult for consumers to observe. Second, even the nominal rate of coverage is quite costly for consumers to
obtain: Unlike many products, the price that a carrier charges depends substantially on the particularities of the policyholder.218 This means that insurers cannot

215.
216.

217.
218.

COMPETITION: A CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT, at ES 1 (2004), available at http://www.
mondomundi.alta.org/govt/issues/04/ftc_mtgebroker_0227.pdf; Daylian Cain et al., The
Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
4–8 (2005).
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 199, at 3067.
See generally Scott E. Harrington, Effects of Prior Approval Rate Regulation of Auto Insurance,
in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: RESTORING COMPETITION
AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY, supra note 17, at 285, 309–10; Harvey
Rosenfield, Auto Insurance: Crisis and Reform, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 69, 70 (1998).
Schwarcz, supra note 116, at 734–37.
Such risk-based pricing is also a feature of many credit products.
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advertise a single price and that in order to obtain an accurate price quotation,
consumers must engage in the time-consuming process of applying for coverage.219
To address the perceived problem of excessive insurance rates, most states
maintain an extensive program of rate review. Some states require that all carriers
receive preapproval from the insurance department before they change their rates,
others review carriers’ rate changes after they are implemented, and some states
do not affirmatively review premium rates at all.220 In addition to being quite
costly, there is substantial evidence that, in many markets, this regulation can
have unintended negative consequences, such as intensifying rate volatility and
discouraging carriers from decreasing their rates.221 There is even evidence that it
does not, in fact, result in the suppression of rates over the long run.222
Although state insurance regulation devotes massive resources to directly
regulating insurance rates, it does virtually nothing to leverage transparencyoriented tools to address the perceived risk of excessive rates. Perhaps the best
way states could address affordability problems using transparency would be to
structure insurance products to facilitate consumer comparison shopping.223 This
would eliminate the difficulty consumers currently face in comparing coverage
and rates on an apples-to-apples basis. Indeed, the federal government insisted
on this approach with respect to the sale of Medigap policies.224 Available evidence suggests that this approach successfully promoted reduced insurance prices.225 Admittedly, this strategy limits consumer choice, though it is arguably less
intrusive than the aggressive rate regulation currently deployed in most states. In
219. Such risk-based pricing may allow carriers to discriminate in the prices they charge to

220.
221.

222.
223.
224.
225.

different customers, charging more to consumers who tend not to comparison shop, such as
long-time policyholders. See OFFICE OF PUB. INS. COUNCIL, NOT SHOPPING FOR
INSURANCE CAN LEAD TO OVERCHARGES, http://www.opic.state.tx.us/images/Final_
Failure_to_Shop_Report_-_7_26_12ENGLISH.pdf.
See generally Cummins, supra note 17.
See SHARON TENNYSON, NETWORKS FIN. INST., POLICY BRIEF NO. 2007-PB-03,
EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES OF RATE REGULATION IN INSURANCE MARKETS 18
(2007), available at http://indstate.edu/business/nfi/leadership/briefs/2007-PB-03_Tennyson.pdf.
But see J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., STATE AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE REGULATION: A NATIONAL QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND IN-DEPTH
REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA’S UNIQUELY EFFECTIVE REGULATORY SYSTEM (2008),
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/state_auto_insura
nce_report.pdf (arguing that rate regulation has proven uniquely successful in California).
See Harrington, supra note 216.
See supra Part I.A.4, Structuring Markets and/or Products.
See Thomas Rice & Kathleen Thomas, Evaluating the New Medigap Standardization
Regulations, 11 HEALTH AFF. 194, 194 (1992).
See, e.g., Lauren A. McCormack et al., Medigap Reform Legislation of 1990: Have the
Objectives Been Met?, 18 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 157, 167–69 (1996); Thomas
Rice et al., The Impact of Policy Standardization on the Medigap Market, 34 INQUIRY 106,
113–14 (1997).
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any event, states could adopt less aggressive versions of this approach, such as requiring that all initial pricing of coverage take place on a standardized form but
thereafter allowing carriers to offer their own personalized adjustments.226
A second, less intrusive pricing-transparency strategy that states have ignored is mimicking the ACA’s approach to facilitating price competition by
promoting the use of insurance exchanges.227 Consumers who purchase health
insurance on an exchange in 2014 will be able to comparison shop more easily
among plans.228 Although the impact of the ACA on rates within the exchanges
is a matter of some contention, initial indications suggest that exchanges are indeed helping to promote lower prices, particularly given various other elements of
the ACA—such as increased coverage requirements and adverse selection—
which may push prices in the opposite direction.229 State lawmakers could establish similar regulated marketplaces to facilitate consumer comparison of property/casualty policies.230 They could go even further by developing pricing
measures, such as actuarial value, that embed within them presumed product-use
patterns. Similarly, they might embrace full disclosure of insurer product and
pricing information to facilitate smart disclosure options that could recommend
coverage tailored to individuals’ particularized preferences.231

226. See supra Part I.A.4, Structuring Markets and/or Products.
227. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH INSURANCE

228.
229.
230.
231.

EXCHANGES AND THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES 15–16 (2010), available at http://www.
commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-Reports/2010/Jul/Health-InsuranceExchanges-and-the-Affordable-Care-Act.aspx. One way states could promote the development of private insurance exchanges is by better regulating commercial websites that purport
to provide consumers with multiple premium quotations but in fact operate as lead generators. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, BEST PRACTICES FOR PREMIUM
COMPARISON WEBSITES (2012), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_trans_
read_wg_exposures_best_practices.pdf. State lawmakers could prohibit insurance companies
from advertising or soliciting business on premium comparison websites unless they operate as
advertised and generate immediate premium quotes from multiple carriers. They could also
require these sites to disclose the number of carriers from whom they offer quotes relative to the
number of carriers in the marketplace, as well as information about commission levels that the site
collects. Alternatively, states could provide this type of premium comparison information directly
to consumers in the form of a regulator-provided premium comparison guide. But given the
difficulties with keeping such a tool up to date and having it incorporate most rating factors, this
approach is unlikely to be effective. According to a recent survey of state insurance offices, only
three states maintain this type of premium comparison tool. See id.
See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking.
See LAURA SKOPEK & RICHARD KRONICK, MARKET COMPETITION WORKS: SILVER PREMIUMS IN
THE 2014 INDIVIDUAL MARKET ARE SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN EXPECTED (2013), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2013/MarketCompetitionPremiums/ib_premiums_update.pdf.
See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking.
See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking, for a discussion
of recommender systems.
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An alternative transparency-oriented approach that state insurance law
could borrow from the ACA would be to refocus states’ rate review process on
communicating with consumers rather than restricting carrier rates. The ACA
directs HHS, in conjunction with the states, to identify unreasonable premium
increases.232 But the ACA does not empower lawmakers to prohibit these rate
increases; it instead requires the public posting of rate increases that are deemed
unreasonable.233 This approach might inform consumers about which insurers
are charging unreasonable rates while avoiding some of the pitfalls of more aggressive rate review.234 According to HHS, initial results suggest that this program has resulted in fewer dramatic increases in rates, though systematic evidence
on this point is still not available.235
Finally, state insurance regulators could consider improving the transparency of insurance pricing by requiring carriers to disclose the rating factors they use
to determine pricing for individual policyholders and the relative weight they
place on those factors.236 Doing this might allow consumers to narrow their
searches to companies that are more likely to offer them affordable rates based on
their unique characteristics.237 For instance, a consumer who drives many miles
but maintains an excellent credit score could target companies that place high reliance on credit score and limited reliance on miles driven.

232. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1003, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,

139–40 (2010).
233. See id.
234. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Review of Insurance Rates, CENTERS

FOR

MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives
/Health-Insurance-Market-Reforms/Review-of-Insurance-Rates.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2013) (“The Affordable Care Act brings an unprecedented level of scrutiny and transparency
to health insurance rate increases.”).
235. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Care Law Saved an
Estimated $2.1 Billion for Consumers (Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2012pres/09/20120911a.html; see also ROSE CHU & RICHARD KRONICK,
HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUM INCREASES IN THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET SINCE THE
PASSAGE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2013), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/
health/reports/2013/rateincreaseindvmkt/rb.pdf.
236. See Ctr. for Econ. Justice, Comments on Best Practices for Developing a Premium
Comparison Guide (Feb. 22, 2011) (on file with author) (proposing such a disclosure and
explaining in detail how it might work). Currently, it is virtually impossible for consumers to
get any sense of the rating factors that different companies use, much less the relative weight
that different companies place on those factors. See id.
237. This disclosure would provide information on the weight of rating factors for policyholders as
a whole. This might allow consumers to narrow their search among the carriers most likely
to offer them reasonable rates; it would not allow policyholders to determine definitively
which carrier offered the lowest rates.
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III.

ADEQUACY OF TRANSPARENCY REGULATION IN LIFE INSURANCE
AND ANNUITIES

As with property/casualty insurance, transparency-oriented consumer protection regulation is systematically and strikingly inadequate in the life/annuity
insurance domains. This Part demonstrates this claim with respect to four core
regulatory issues in life/annuity markets: (1) solvency regulation, (2) guaranty
fund protection, (3) annuity disclosures, and (4) price competition in cash-value
life policies. Moreover, it shows how financial regulators in other domains have
consistently developed more robust and thoughtful mechanisms for promoting
market transparency than have state insurance regulators. Unlike in Part II, the
primary, though not sole, point of comparison in this Part is federal securities law,
which frequently raises many similar regulatory issues as life/annuity insurance
markets, given that products in both domains aim to advance consumers’ savings
and investment objectives.
A.

Solvency Regulation
1.

Full Disclosure

The central goal of insurance regulation is to ensure that carriers have sufficient financial resources to pay claims when they come due.238 This goal, however, is particularly important in the life/annuity insurance arena because of the
long-term nature of these carriers’ obligations to policyholders.239 The tools that
regulators deploy to achieve this goal fall under the heading of solvency regulation, and they include risk-based capital requirements, reserve requirements, and
investment restrictions.240 Despite the central importance of solvency regulation
to insurance regulation generally, and life/annuity insurance in particular, this
form of regulation employs remarkably few transparency-oriented tools.
In fact, state insurance regulation affirmatively limits the availability of public information about which insurers are in tenuous financial condition. Indeed,
about half of the states label it an “unfair trade practice” for anyone in the insurance business to communicate any information that is “derogatory to the financial

238. See EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND

INSURANCE 106 (10th ed. 2008).
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240. See ROBERT W. KLEIN, A REGULATOR’S INTRODUCTION TO THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY

107–13, 140–67 (2d ed. 2005).
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condition of an insurer,” even if that information is true.241 Similarly, many states
prohibit anyone in the insurance business from communicating any information
about the risk-based capital level of an insurer.242 Even the annual and quarterly
financial accounting statements that insurers file with state regulators—which
contain substantial amounts of data on the financial health of filing companies—
are only made publicly available for a fee, at least when more than a few statements are downloaded.243
To be sure, bank regulators similarly limit the availability of information regarding troubled banks.244 But in many ways banking rules are less extreme than
insurance regulations. For instance, bank holding companies’ quarterly performance reports are publicly available, without cost, through the Federal Reserve’s
National Information Center.245 Moreover, gag rules in banking are actually less
extensive than they are in insurance: The only such rule involves disclosure by
agencies and banks of safety and soundness examination reports and grades.246
Even more importantly, though, the secrecy involved in the prudential
regulation of banks does not justify comparable levels of secrecy in insurance
regulation. The primary reason for the secrecy that surrounds the financial conditions of particular banks is that banks are uniquely susceptible to policyholder
runs because a substantial amount of their liabilities are demand deposits that can
be withdrawn in full at any time by policyholders for any reason.247 As such, negative financial information about a bank can actually substantially exacerbate that
bank’s financial problems by triggering a bank run.248 Moreover, the vast majority of bank depositors can, and do, protect themselves from this risk by ensuring
that their money is deposited in such a way that it is fully protected by Federal
241. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-12-9 (LexisNexis 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-445

242.
243.

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

(2002) (West); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-816(3) (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. §
27-4-1-4 (LexisNexis 1999); see also Life Insurance: An Industry Built on Secrecy, 31 INS. F. 45,
47–48 (2004).
See Life Insurance: An Industry Built on Secrecy, supra note 241, at 48; see, e.g., NAIC MODEL
LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 312-1 (2012), available at http://www.naic.org/
store/free/MDL-312.pdf.
The NAIC projects it will earn $25.9 million in 2012 from database filing fees paid by the
industry and another $18.9 million from sales of its insurance data products. R.J. Lehmann,
FIO, FOIA and a Free Market in Insurance Data, R ST. (Oct. 27, 2011), http://rstreet.org/
2011/10/27/fio-foia-and-a-free-market-in-insurance-data.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Regulation: The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1 (1987).
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s): Financial Report Questions, FED. RES., http://www.ffiec.gov/
nicpubweb/content/help/NICFAQReport.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
See generally id.
See Helen A. Garten, The Consumerization of Financial Regulation, 77 WASH. U. L. REV.
287, 298 (1999).
See id.
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Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance.249 Most bank depositors
consequently do not need information about their bank’s financial health in order
to enjoy absolute security in their deposits.
By contrast, life insurers are at much less risk of a policyholder run than are
banks. Many forms of life insurance and annuities do not permit policyholders to
withdraw funds voluntarily.250 Those that do typically charge a substantial fee
that limits the desirability of this option.251 Partially for these reasons, policyholders conceptualize life insurance products differently than bank accounts, considering them long-term investments rather than sources of instant liquidity.
History bears these distinctions out: There has never been a run on the life insurance industry writ large, despite occasional predictions of such runs in the popular
press.252 And while there has once or twice been a “run” on an individual life insurer, this was only after it became clear that the insurer would not have been able
to rehabilitate itself.253
Additionally, it is much harder for insurance policyholders to protect themselves against solvency risk than it is for bank depositors to do so. This is because
FDIC insurance applies a separate limit to every account that an individual owns
at different banks, allowing depositors with cash that exceeds the FDIC limit to
simply open up accounts at multiple banks.254 By contrast, state guarantee
funds—which provide policyholders with some measure of protection in the
event that their insurer cannot meet its financial obligations255—provide only a
single limit per individual that cannot be increased by spreading protection around

249. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 1.
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vulnerable to a loss of confidence and subsequent pressures to liquidate assets rapidly in order
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See, e.g., ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 30–31 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that whole-life insurance policies include
savings components from which money can be drawn at a designated interest rate).
See Scott E. Harrington, Policyholder Runs, Life Insurance Company Failures, and Insurance
Solvency Regulation, 15 REGULATION 27, 30 (1992).
See generally Harry DeAngelo et al., The Collapse of First Executive Corporation Junk Bonds,
Adverse Publicity, and the ‘Run on the Bank’ Phenomenon, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 287 (1994).
See Deposit Insurance Summary, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/dis (last updated Oct.
17, 2013).
See Martin F. Grace & Hal S. Scott, An Optional Federal Charter for Insurance: Rationale and
Design, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55, 90
(Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009).
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to multiple different companies.256 Additionally, unlike FDIC insurance, state
guarantee funds are neither prefunded nor backed by the full faith and credit of the
federal government.257
For these reasons, securities law, rather than banking, provides a more appropriate basis of comparison for evaluating the transparency of carriers’ financial
health. Viewed against this backdrop, the lack of transparency surrounding insurers’ solvency is striking.258 Transparency and disclosure are, of course, the core
tools of securities law.259 Thus, all publicly held firms must file annual and quarterly financial statements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), which are then made publicly available without charge through the Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR).260 Individuals who purchase securities products must be provided with a prospectus for the
product that discloses all material risks.261 And regulated entities must promptly
disclose any information suggesting the prospect of a deteriorating financial condition.262
A similar embrace of transparency could improve the effectiveness of insurance solvency regulation. Insurance consumers, particularly life insurance consumers, care substantially about the solvency of their carriers. This consumer prefpreference means that there is already a great deal of market discipline with respect
to insurers’ solvency.263 Increasing the availability of information about insurers’
solvency would improve this market discipline by removing the primacy of rating
agencies in intermediating this information to the marketplace. Indeed, for these
very reasons, one of the three “pillars” of Solvency II, the European system for sol-
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_0611010.pdf.
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See Jon S. Hanson & Duncan R. Farney, Life Insurance Companies: Their Promotion and
Regulation, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 175, 311–12 (1965) (comparing the minimal amount of risk
information that must be disclosed to an individual who purchases a life insurance policy for a
single premium to the significant amount that must be disclosed to an individual who invests
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Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 82, at 669.
See generally STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2011).
See generally id.
See generally id.
See Scott E. Harrington, Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY
BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE, supra note 250, at 87.
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vency regulation that is currently under construction, is transparency.264 Improving transparency might also increase regulatory accountability and limit the risk of
regulatory forbearance in the face of a failing insurance company.265
2.

Summary Disclosure

An additional, though admittedly more contestable, way in which state solvency regulation wrongly eschews transparency-based regulation involves summary disclosure. State law does not require insurers to disclose in summary form
to consumers any information about their financial strength.266 Such a requirement could easily piggyback on the financial strength ratings that firms like A.M.
Best and Moody’s produce, which are generally easy to understand because they
aggregate a tremendous range of information into a single metric.267 While carriers with strong ratings actively advertise that fact, many consumers unknowingly
purchase coverage from poorly rated carriers.268 Requiring disclosure of this information could improve market discipline as well as the matching of consumers
with insurers who meet their price/quality preferences.
To be sure, there are various legitimate objections to this proposal. Most
importantly, the fact that the insurers who are rated are also the ones who pay rating agencies undermines the reliability of financial ratings.269 The 2008 financial
crisis illustrated this point well.270 Additionally, entrenching the role of rating
agencies in financial regulations may exacerbate the problem by enhancing their
power and thus insurers’ incentives to game these ratings.271
Despite these criticisms, it ultimately makes sense to mandate that insurers
disclose their financial-strength ratings to consumers. The relevance of these ratings to consumers is undeniable, even though the ratings are also imperfect.
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Steven W. Pottier & David W. Sommer, Property-Liability Insurer Financial Strength
Ratings: Differences Across Rating Agencies, 66 J. RISK & INS. 621 (1999).
See The Need to Disclose to Consumers the Financial Ratings of Insurance Companies, supra note 266.
See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 50–51 (2004).
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Moreover, these ratings may be harder to game than other types of financial ratings, as insurance regulators independently assess insurers’ financial strength. As
such, if an insurer earned a financial rating that was wildly undeserved, regulators
would be able to spot this discrepancy rather easily. This, in turn, means that rating agencies in the insurance sphere are likely to be much less willing to game the
system than they were in the context of specific mortgage products or for firms
like Enron, whose financial health was not the subject of independent scrutiny.272
In contrast to insurance policyholders, purchasers of insurance company securities receive financial strength ratings, which are deemed material to them.273
To be sure, these are provided not in summary form, but in a detailed prospectus.
Although insurers are not required to provide financial-strength ratings in mandatory consumer disclosures under U.S. law, other countries do indeed have such
requirements in the insurance sphere.274
B.

Informing Consumers About Guarantee Fund Protection

In addition to regulating insurers’ financial capacity to pay claims, states also
require insurers to be members of guarantee funds. These funds protect policyholders against the prospect that their insurer will not have sufficient funds to pay
claims.275 As with solvency regulation, while these guarantee funds provide an
important safety net to policyholders in all lines of insurance, their importance is
arguably heightened in the life insurance context because of the long-term nature
of this policy line.
Despite the importance of guarantee funds to consumers, most states affirmatively restrict insurers and their agents from informing consumers of the extent of guarantee fund protection they enjoy. Indeed, the NAIC model law on
the topic, which most states have adopted, prohibits advertising the existence of a
state’s Insurance Guaranty Association for the purpose of sales, solicitation, or
inducement to purchase insurance.276 The law does require policyholders receive
at the time of policy delivery—several weeks after purchase—a summary disclosure describing the general purposes and limitations of the fund.277
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Although the purpose of these gag rules is to limit moral hazard,278 they
have the impact of undermining the capacity of consumers to make informed decisions among competing life insurance carriers. Providing information about
guarantee fund protection after policy purchase does virtually nothing to help
consumers make informed decisions about their products in light of guarantee
fund protection.279 Yet accurate information about guarantee fund protection is
vital to consumers looking to choose life insurance products that match their
preferences. This is because the extent of the guarantee fund protection that
life/annuities policyholders enjoy varies significantly by state and by product and
is often woefully insufficient to protect even an average consumer’s policy rights
fully. For instance, with respect to life insurance death benefits, most states provide only $300,000 of protection, with some states providing up to $500,000 of
protection.280 In the case of life insurance cash-surrender and cash-withdrawal
protection, most states cap protection at $100,000, but some have substantially
larger caps.281 With respect to annuities, some states provide only up to $100,000
of guarantee fund protection, many provide up to $250,000 of protection, and
some provide $300,000 or $500,000 in protection.282 There is good reason to believe that consumers who are informed about these levels of protection at the time
they are selecting a product will more carefully scrutinize their insurer’s financial
status to the extent they are not fully covered.283 Alternatively, just as consumers
routinely do in banking, they may alter the amount of their purchase and/or the
product they purchase in order to maximize the extent of their protection.
Once again, the lack of transparency with respect to state guarantee funds is
put into sharp relief when state insurance law is compared to analogous federal
law. In particular, bank depositors enjoy federal protection from the risk that
their bank will become insolvent through FDIC insurance. Yet banks routinely
and prominently advertise this protection to depositors—something that the
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FDIC requires them to do.284 Banks also advise depositors on strategies to maximize protection, such as holding a joint account or holding an account with multiple beneficiaries. Moreover, when banks sell products unprotected by FDIC
insurance they routinely warn consumers of this fact.285
C.

Informing Consumers About Annuity Terms and Conditions

Because of their complexity and variability, annuities raise a host of consumer protection problems. At their core, annuities are contracts wherein an insurer promises a policyholder a series of future payments in exchange for receiving
an earlier lump sum payment, or series of payments, from the policyholder. But
the details surrounding this basic framework can vary in an almost infinite set of
ways. These include (1) whether insurer payouts are immediate or deferred; (2)
whether policyholders contribute in a lump sum or over time; (3) the ways in
which money placed in the annuity earns a return; (4) the guarantees associated
with insurer payments; and (5) the existence of market-based adjustments to insurer payouts.286
This complexity raises two risks for consumers. The first is that a consumer
may purchase an annuity that is not well suited to her particular needs.287 The
suitability of a particular annuity product depends on innumerable consumer details, including anticipated lifespan, savings, future financial needs, and retirement plans.288 Second, the complexity of annuities can undermine competition
across companies, resulting in excessive fees and/or poor investment performance. Indeed, according to one source, annuity fees average about 2.51 percent
of one’s investment, a dramatic difference from the low-cost mutual fund options
that are available for fees of 0.2 percent.289

284. See generally CARNELL ET AL., supra note 1.
285. See generally id.
286. See generally SCOTT HARRINGTON & GREGORY NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND

INSURANCE 297–334 (2004).
287. In 2005, a class action lawsuit was filed against insurer Allianz claiming that the company

sold actuarially unsuitable annuities to elderly consumers. Chris Serres, A Split Decision in
Allianz Life Annuity Lawsuit, STAR TRIB., Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/
business/64089107.html.
288. See FINRA Rule 2111: Suitability, FINRA.ORG, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display
_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 (last updated Feb. 4, 2013).
289. Margaret Collins, Variable Annuities: Lifelong Income, High Cost, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, June 23, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_27/
b4235047436378.htm. As one consumer-finance expert explained, experts understand the
“flip side to the annuity sales pitch—including the high costs; the long surrender periods with
the resulting high surrender fees; and that many annuity sales are inappropriate because more
suitable low-cost investment options are available.” Mel Lindauer, Annuities: Good, Bad or

444

61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014)

To address these concerns, state insurance regulation relies on two strategies. First, it requires that insurers obtain personal information from prospective
customers before a sale and evaluate whether the annuity being sold is “suitable”
for that particular individual.290 Second, and of more direct relevance here, state
law requires certain disclosures to be made to annuity consumers. This dual regulatory strategy is sensible. On one hand, disclosures are not sufficient to protect
consumers because annuities are extremely complex and multifaceted products.291
On the other hand, though, mandatory disclosures can provide regulatory benefits that suitability rules cannot, such as promoting competition and helping consumers ensure that an annuity is not merely suitable for their needs, but optimal.
Unfortunately, the NAIC’s annuity disclosure regime violates each of the
three principles of effective disclosure described in Part I. The annuity disclosure
strategy is based on an NAIC model law dating back to 1999.292 Under the law,
purchasers must receive both (1) a Buyer’s Guide and (2) a disclosure document.
The Buyer’s Guide, created by the NAIC, describes the basic structure and general features of annuities. The disclosure document is a company-drafted form
that must contain a description of specific contract terms and “emphasiz[e] its
long-term nature.”293 The law also includes a lengthy section placing strict guidelines on the form and the content of illustrations used to describe annuities.294
Perhaps the most central deficiency of this disclosure regime is that it does
not rely on a single disclosure template used by individual firms but instead allows
insurers to design their own disclosure documents. While disclosures must include certain information, this information need not be labeled in any particular
way, presented in the same location on different carriers’ forms, or subjected to
consumer testing. As explained in depth earlier, this inhibits consumers’ ability
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to comparison shop.295 One prominent industry insider sums up the result: “Say
you wanted to compare five products side by side . . . . Good luck.”296
The lack of any standardized disclosure document also undermines enforcement of the disclosure rules that do exist. Despite the fact that individual
companies design their own unique disclosure documents, these documents are
not regularly submitted to or reviewed by regulators in most states.297 In fact, the
only enforcement mechanism that most states employ to ensure compliance with
applicable disclosure rules is market conduct exams.298 But such exams vary in
frequency and are incredibly broad in scope, meaning that the amount of time
that can be spent reviewing disclosure documents is minimal.299
The annuity disclosure rule not only fails to provide a usable and uniform
disclosure document but the information that it requires insurers to place in their
disclosures is simultaneously excessive and deficient.300 The disclosure document
must include countless warnings and complex pieces of information about contract conditions and terms.301 These requirements include information about accessing the current value of the contract, surrender fees,302 tax implications of
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AnnuityDisclosureFAQs.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (“Information contained in a
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Puzzle, INVESTMENT NEWS (Oct. 30, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20111030/REG/310309967 (“The difficulty in benchmarking lifetime-income products
stems from the fact that no two are exactly alike.”).
This contrasts with the annuity contracts that life insurers sell, which generally must be
submitted to and approved by insurance regulators before their sale.
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withdrawals,303 guaranteed and nonguaranteed elements of the contract,304 the
calculation of the initial interest rate and the guaranteed minimum rate,305 and
the calculation of death benefits and the operation of any riders to the contract.306
Much of this information is useful only to a consumer with a relatively high degree of financial sophistication. This is particularly true of disclosures related to
the calculation of rates or benefits. All this information appears alongside much
more fundamental disclosures related to the basic functioning of the annuity’s
fees and penalties. While the NAIC rules require excessive disclosure in some areas, they contain notable omissions in others. In particular, they make no attempt to distill the various costs and interest rates of an annuity into a single
figure to facilitate comparison.307
Yet another failing of the NAIC’s disclosure strategy is that it does not ensure that the relevant documents find their way into consumers’ hands in time to
be helpful.308 Delivery of the Buyer’s Guide and disclosure documents can take
place at any time up until the point of sale, meaning that the documents may not
be delivered until a consumer has already emotionally and mentally committed to
the purchase.309 If the sale does not take place in a face-to-face meeting, the documents can be delivered after the purchase, as long as the buyer is given a fifteenday penalty-free period to return the contract.310 And in the case of online purchases, the NAIC rule requires only that the insurer take “reasonable steps” to
make these documents viewable and printable from its own website.311
Disclosure efforts in comparable regulatory domains suggest the inadequacy
of these efforts. Consider the SEC’s work on consumer disclosures of mutual
funds and variable annuities, which directly compete with state-regulated annuities.312 To be sure, these efforts have been far from ideal, and they have prompted
quite compelling calls for reform.313 But they nonetheless are far more sensible
and sophisticated than the state-based annuity disclosure regime described above.
303.
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Most notably, the SEC requires all mutual funds to provide investors with a
“summary prospectus” that is at the front of the overall prospectus.314 The document is limited to several pages and contains the key pieces of information that
mutual fund investors should consider.315 This information is written in plain
English and displayed in a standardized order and format.316 This layered approach to disclosure makes detailed information that may be of interest to sophisticated investors available in the larger prospectus, without burdening ordinary
investors with these details.317 For the last four years, the SEC has also been
working on a comparable standardized summary prospectus document for variable annuities, though it has not yet released the proposal.318
Additionally, unlike state insurance regulators, the SEC requires all disclosure documents associated with either mutual funds or variable annuities to be
filed with the agency.319 It then reviews those documents carefully for accuracy
and compliance with the SEC’s rules. As one SEC official explained: “Many of
these products are very complex in their design and operation, making it very important that insurers provide clear and useful disclosure regarding how the products work and the risks of investing in them. For that reason, the Division
carefully reviews these disclosures in its review of registration statements.”320
To be sure, crafting a uniform, summary disclosure of annuities is likely to
be a difficult task. But there is already at least one decent model for such a document: The American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) has released a series of
universal templates for annuity disclosures.321 Of course, because the ACLI tem-
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INVESTMENT COMPANIES (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/338998.pdf.
See id.
See id.
See supra Part I.A, Transparency and Improving Consumer Decisionmaking (emphasizing
the importance of layered disclosure).
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Director of Investment Management
publicly endorsed the creation of a “variable annuity short form disclosure document” and the SEC’s
chair acknowledged that the SEC was actively developing such a document. See INSURED
RETIREMENT INST., VARIABLE ANNUITY SUMMARY PROSPECTUS HIGH IN DEMAND BY
CONSUMERS: AN EXAMINATION OF CONSUMER PREFERENCES, INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES,
AND IRI INITIATIVES (2011).
See Andrew J. Donohue, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Remarks at the 2010 ALI-ABA
Conference on Life Insurance Company Products (Oct. 28, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch102810ajd.htm).
Id.
AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS ET AL., IMPROVING ANNUITY DISCLOSURE: A LIFE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE (2008), http://www.acli.com/Issues/Documents/75fd8
a4aa0c344f9983e03c1f4e042d3DisclosureTemplataesOhio_nva.pdf.
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plates are building off the NAIC’s previous work, they share some of the fundamental flaws of the NAIC approach—most notably, they still rely on dense text
descriptions of the products in question. But they also represent a significant step
toward solving the most notable problem with the NAIC law: its failure to create
a standardized summary disclosure format universal to all annuities in a product
class. Not only do the ACLI templates use an identical format for products of
the same type, they use very similar formats for products of different types, helping consumers conduct comparisons across product classes. Unfortunately, use of
the ACLI’s templates is entirely discretionary.322
D. Improving Consumer Understanding of the Cost of Cash-Value
Life Policies
Although controversy regarding appropriate disclosure of cost in life insurance markets dates back to at least the 1960s, state rules have long failed to require any simplified disclosure of price terms analogous to the ubiquitous annual
percentage rate (APR) of credit products. To appreciate this issue, some background is needed. Life insurance policies can either be term or cash value.
Term-life insurance is a relatively homogenous product: Carriers promise to pay
a specified death benefit for a set premium over a specified period of time.323 By
contrast, cash-value life insurance products are extremely heterogeneous and
complex.324 At their core, though, these policies combine a term-life insurance
policy with a savings or investment component. As the savings/investment com-

322. Both Iowa and Ohio have adopted pilot programs to encourage use of the forms—most

notably, by presuming that any insurer who uses the templates has already satisfied the states’
disclosure requirements—but there has been no state or regulatory agency that has simply
mandated use of the template. See, e.g., AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS ET AL.,
TEMPLATES FOR IMPROVING ANNUITY DISCLOSURE: OHIO PILOT PROGRAM (2008),
https://www.acli.com/Issues/Pages/GR09-120.aspx; OHIO DEP’T OF INS., OHIO JOINS
INITIATIVE TO IMPROVE ANNUITY DISCLOSURE, http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/
Company/Documents/AnnuityDisclosureFactSheet.pdf.
323. See generally KENNETH BLACK, JR. & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, LIFE INSURANCE (11th ed. 1987).
324. The most basic cash-value policies are “whole life.” These policies generally pay a fixed death
benefit and have level premiums that are paid out either for the life of the policy or for a
preset number of years. As the savings component of the policy increases, the insurance
component decreases in order to keep the death benefit constant. In contrast to whole-life
policies, variable-life policies link the death benefit to the performance of investment options
selected by the policyholder. Universal life policies, by contrast, have variable premiums that
can be shifted, within various parameters, by the policyholder during the policy term. The
savings component accumulates based on stated interest rates that the insurer can vary and
policy expenses are deducted from the account on a monthly basis. Variable universal policies
combine these features, with return on the universal policy based on the performance of
policyholder-selected investment options. Id.
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ponent of the policy grows, it increasingly funds the death benefit, thus allowing
premiums to remain level as the policyholder becomes older. During his or her
lifetime, the policyholder can access the savings component of the policy in various ways, including by surrendering the policy and potentially paying some penalty or by taking out a loan secured by the policy’s value. If the policy is
“participating,” it may also pay out dividends to the policyholder.325
The combined savings and insurance components of cash-value policies
make it very difficult for consumers to compare different policies. This is because
the premiums of cash-value policies do not, in fact, reflect the costs of these policies. Instead, in order to evaluate cost, one must assume a specified savings rate
and then extrapolate cost on that basis. Alternatively, one can specify a particular
cost for the insurance component of the policy, and then measure the rate of return. Either way, though, a policy can have relatively high premiums but be
quite affordable/high-return or a policy can have relatively low premiums but
be quite expensive/low-return.326
Whereas markets in term-life insurance are extremely competitive, the
complexity of cash-value insurance policies has impeded beneficial competition.
An important Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study from the 1970s found
that cash-value life insurance policies routinely paid a substantially lower rate of
return than comparable savings vehicles and that price dispersion of these policies
was much larger than price dispersion for similar products.327 A more recent
study of the life insurance industry by two prominent economists found that the
price of term-life insurance policies decreased dramatically—between 8 and 15
percent—in the mid-1990s because of the development of Internet tools that
easily allowed consumers to compare different policies.328 By contrast, the price
of cash-value policies did not fall at all during this period, and may have actually
increased.329 The reason, they suggest, is that Internet tools did not allow consumers to compare the prices of different cash-value policies because of their
complexity and heterogeneity.330
325. Id.
326. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, LIFE INSURANCE COST DISCLOSURE 70–71 (1979),

http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/197907lifeinsurancecost.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
327. Id. at 25–62; see also Spencer L. Kimball & Mark S. Rapaport, What Price “Price Disclosure”?:

The Trend to Consumer Protection in Life Insurance, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 1025, 1026–27.

328. Jeffrey R. Brown & Austan Goolsbee, Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive?:

Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry, 110 J. POL. ECON. 481 (2002).

329. Id. at 493–94. One consequence of elevated insurance prices is decreased insurance protection. As

Kyle Logue has described, underinsurance in the life arena is a pervasive problem. See Kyle D.
Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 23–
26 (2001).
330. Brown & Goolsbee, supra note 328, at 493–94.

450

61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014)

The lack of price transparency in cash-value life insurance markets has also
been the source of several acute consumer protection scandals in recent decades.331 In one particularly high-profile and widespread scandal, consumers were
sold “vanishing premium” policies on the basis of representations that the savings
components of these policies would grow at a sufficiently rapid rate to cover the
cost of coverage.332 These growth rates were not achieved, causing policyholders
to continue paying premiums well beyond the promised time horizon. Smallerscale, but repeated, scandals have erupted at various times as it has come to light
that agents frequently encourage insurance policyholders to replace a cash-value
policy with a different policy.333 Such replacements are often not in consumers’
interests because the cost of coverage is quite high in the first years of cash-value
policies when much of the savings component of premiums is directed toward
paying commissions and administrative expenses.334
Despite these problems, current regulatory rules do not require any form of
standardized disclosure of the cost of cash-value life insurance policies.335 This is
all the more remarkable because the mechanism for making such a disclosure has
been the source of study and refinement for nearly fifty years. In 1966, Joseph
Belth proposed a uniform scheme for the disclosure of cost information about
cash-value life insurance policies.336 Shortly thereafter, U.S. Senator Phillip Hart
held hearings on the topic and suggested a Truth in Life Insurance Bill that
would mirror the recently enacted Truth in Lending Act.337 That law requires
331. See Dwight K. Bartlett, III, Life Insurance Cost Disclosure: A Regulatory Viewpoint, 13 J. INS.

332.
333.

334.
335.

336.
337.

REG. 433, 435 (1995) (explaining that the misleading nature of net cost method has come
under increased scrutiny since the 1970s); Joseph Belth, Deceptive Sales Practices in the Life
Insurance Business, 41 J. RISK & INS. 305, 305 (1974) (asserting that deceptive life insurance
sales practices are widespread enough to constitute a national scandal).
Tom Foley & Carolyn Johnson, Introduction to Symposium on the Regulation of Life Cost
Disclosure and Market Conduct, 13 J. INS. REG. 398, 398 (1995).
For instance, in 1975, Senator Stone introduced a bill that focused on his concern about Veterans
who were moving in large numbers into new life insurance policies through conversion policies.
Disclosure of Insurance Policy Information to Veterans: Hearings on S. 718 Before the Subcomm. on
Hous., Ins. & Cemeteries of the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977). In 1984 another
hearing on policy replacements was held by Congress in response to evidence that conversion
policy sales accounted for one out of every two cash-value policy sales. James H. Hunt, Life Cost
Disclosure: Prospects for True Reform, 13 J. INS. REG. 405, 407 (1995).
See Hunt, supra note 333.
See NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 580-1 (2005). These rules do
require a policy summary to be delivered after the sale of coverage. These mandatory
disclosures suffer, however, from many of the flaws described above for annuity policy
summaries: They are nonstandardized, delivered after the policy is purchased, and do not
contain useful information.
David R. Kamerschen & John J. Pascucci, The Retail Price Structure in American Life
Insurance: Comment, 36 J. RISK & INS. 493, 493 (1969).
Hunt, supra note 333, at 412.
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lenders to disclose to consumers the APR of their loans, which encompasses all of
costs of borrowing, including the interest rate and fees.338
These efforts led to extensive scrutiny of life insurance cost disclosure and
eventually to the NAIC, in 1976, adopting a model regulation on life insurance
cost disclosure. The model required disclosure at the time of policy delivery—
rather than before or at the time of sale—of various cost indices for life insurance
policies.339 These included a surrender index that was intended to convey the cost
of a policy if it was surrendered at specified times, a payment index that provided
the cost of the policy if death occurred at certain times, and an equivalent level
annual dividend that was intended to show the relative importance of assumed
dividends in the two indices just described.340
Although this disclosure approach was a small step in the right direction, it
had numerous problems as well. Many of these problems were described in the
aforementioned FTC report on life insurance cost disclosure. The FTC report
noted that the NAIC approach presented consumers with “a bewildering array of
numbers, most of which [were] of doubtful relevance to the average insurance
consumer.”341 These numbers had no intuitive benchmark to allow a consumer
to discern whether a particular index number was good or bad.342 Perhaps even
more importantly, the indices were appropriate only for consumers comparing
similar policy types: They did not allow consumers to compare different types of
cash-value policies to one another or to term insurance.343 Finally, the FTC report noted that the timing of the policy cost information was deficient, because it
“should be provided at a time when a consumer is trying to decide which, if any,
policy to buy—not after that decision has been made.”344 In the face of these
problems, the chairman of the FTC testified to Congress in 1979 that “no other
product in our economy that is purchased by so many people for so much money
is bought with so little understanding of its actual or comparative value.”345
In place of the NAIC model, the FTC suggested that consumers needed a
single cost metric with which to compare different policies. It proposed the Lin-

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667(e) (2012).
Foley & Johnson, supra note 332, at 399.
See FTC REPORT, supra note 326, at 130–31.
Id. at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 133.
Id. at 126. The reason, from an actuarial perspective, is that it fails to control for differing
amounts of risk in policies that are compared. Hunt, supra note 333, at 412–13.
344. See FTC REPORT, supra note 326, at 163.
345. See FTC Study of Life Insurance Cost Disclosure: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
& Transp., 96th Cong. 3 (1979) (statement of Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade
Comm’n).
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ton Yield method as a mechanism to achieve this.346 This single metric can be
used to compare similar and different types of policies, comes with an intrinsic
yardstick because it represents annual rates of return, and shows negative returns
in initial years that warn consumers not to surrender a policy within that period.
To be sure, the metric is not without its problems, particularly because its calculation is highly dependent on both assumed future dividends and term insurance
cost, which can be manipulated.347 Indeed, various alternatives to the Linton
Yield index are possible and may, in fact, be superior, including a version of the
metric that Belth originally proposed fifty years ago348 that would calculate the
expected present value of premiums paid less the expected present value of all
death benefits, policy dividends, and cash values.349
Although numerous plausible approaches are possible for clearly disclosing
the cost of cash-value policies to consumers, the NAIC ultimately chose to jettison any requirement of life insurance cost disclosure. In the wake of the FTC report, the industry successfully lobbied Congress to statutorily bar the FTC from
investigating life insurance without a request from Congress.350 Meanwhile, the
NAIC refused to revisit its model law on policy costs even after the vanishing
premium scandals of the early 1990s, during which time its emphasis shifted to
regulating deceptive illustrations. Eventually, in 2000, now convinced that the
cost disclosures it provided were indeed as useless as the FTC report had indicat-

346. The report left open the prospect of retaining a single surrender index for comparison of

347.

348.
349.

350.

similar policies if this could be combined with a reasonable benchmark. See FTC REPORT,
supra note 326, at 97–182. This recommendation, however, was largely premised on the
notion that many had already gained familiarity with this tool, and so that learning should
not be dismissed. That rationale no longer applies, of course, since the tool was never
adopted.
This method essentially measured the value of different policies by setting a cost for the term
insurance component of policies, subtracting this from cash value premiums, and then
calculating the average annual rate of return that would produce the cash value plus dividends
that the policy pays at any point in time. Id. at 120.
See Hunt, supra note 333.
Joseph M. Belth, The Relationship Between Benefits and Premiums in Life Insurance, 36 J. RISK
& INS. 19 (1969). Subsequent theoretical work has demonstrated that this index is far less
manipulable than other indices and thus would tend to prevent insurer gaming of their
policies to maximize index values. See Ralph A. Winter, On the Choice of an Index for
Disclosure in the Life Insurance Market: An Axiomatic Approach, 49 J. RISK & INS. 513 (1982).
An alternative approach is to separately disclose the cost of coverage per $1000 of coverage
and the rate of return on the savings component of the policy, in each case incorporating an
assumed value for the other formula. See Belth, supra; see also BREADWINNERS’ INS.,
http://www.breadwinnersinsurance.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (proposing a different
approach to summary disclosure of cash-value life insurance cost).
See Hunt, supra note 333, at 412.
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ed two decades earlier, the NAIC quietly decided to eliminate any requirement
that life insurers provide any cost disclosures at all.351
Ultimately, of course, any price disclosure in life insurance markets would be
both imperfect and insufficient. Indeed, numerous critics of the APR measure
have rightly pointed out that it is often mysterious to consumers and failed to
warn them about the dangers of subprime mortgages.352 At the same time, the
answer to these difficulties is to improve summary disclosure metrics, recognize
their limitations, and employ complementary regulatory strategies to limit the
risks associated with those limitations. Instead, the NAIC chose simply to abandon all regulatory efforts to convey relevant pricing information to life insurance
consumers.
IV.

UNDERSTANDING AND BREAKING THE PATTERN

The pattern of consumer protection regulation in insurance is both anomalous and troubling. Instead of embracing disclosure and transparency, state insurance regulation actively resists it while maintaining various forms of consumer
protection regulation that are much more aggressive and costly. What can explain this pattern? Subpart A of this Part considers this question, looking to the
distinctive features of insurance as well as the uniquely state-based nature of its
regulation. Subpart B then argues that, whatever explains the pattern in the past,
there is one clear way to disrupt it in the future: the clear and credible threat of
federal preemption. It argues that the most appropriate way to create this threat
is by expanding the jurisdiction of the CFPB to encompass insurance.

351. In 1993, when the NAIC was evaluating reforms to the regulation of policy illustrations, it

decided not to attempt to improve these disclosures. See id. at 420 (“[N]one of the extensive
deliberations of the LDWG over the last two years has sought to supply consumers with an
effective means of comparing cash value life insurance policies either to each other or to the
alternative of buying term life insurance.”). Then, in 2000, the NAIC voted to eliminate any
model law requiring companies to calculate and disclose these indices to consumers. See
NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 585-1, § 8 (2001) (“When the
Optional Form of the Life Insurance Disclosure Model Regulation with Yield Index was
adopted, the group recommended that each time the disclosure regulation was amended the
alternative with the yield index should also be amended. When the disclosure regulation was
amended, all references to indices were deleted. The working group clarified its intent with
regard to the alternative with the yield index by voting to recommend its deletion from the
list of official NAIC models laws. 2000 Proc. 3rd Quarter 88.”).
352. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 43, at 761 (contending that the 2008 financial crisis was caused in
part by the inadequacies of disclosure in the Truth in Lending Act).
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Understanding the Lack of Transparency in State Insurance Regulation

The political economy of state insurance regulation is complicated and
multifaceted.353 As a result, one-dimensional diagnoses or explanations of the
patterns described above are not possible. At the same time, several distinctive
features of state insurance regulation likely contribute to its tendency to ignore
transparency-based regulation in favor of command-and-control regulation.
First, industry influence over insurance regulators and the NAIC has undoubtedly substantially limited transparency-oriented reforms in insurance. The
industry has openly and vehemently resisted transparency with respect to the
availability of MCAS data, the online availability of policy forms, the disclosure
of price information in life insurance, and numerous other issues discussed
above.354 Such unified industry resistance has a substantial amount of influence
on state insurance regulators and lawmakers.355 The reasons are numerous. The
revolving door between top insurance regulation posts and lucrative industry jobs
is a large problem in insurance regulation.356 In states that elect their insurance
commissioners, insurance companies can also exert their influence through campaign contributions.357 In addition, the industry’s superior technical resources often allow it to provide and analyze information in ways that far surpass the ca-

353. See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF

INSURANCE (1988).
354. See supra Part II.A, Full Disclosure of Claims Payment Practices (discussing industry

resistance to MCAS disclosure); Part II.B, Coverage Consistent with Consumers’
Reasonable Expectations (discussing industry resistance to online access to policy forms);
Part II.C, Full Disclosure of the Availability of Insurance Products for Low-Income and
Minority Populations (industry resistance to HMDA-like data collection); Part II.D,
Improving Consumer Understanding of the Objectivity of Independent Insurance Agents
(discussing industry resistance to disclosure of agents’ conflicts of interest); Part III.B,
Informing Consumers About Guarantee Fund Protection (discussing industry resistance to
guarantee fund disclosure); Part III.D, Improving Consumer Understanding of the Cost of
Cash-Value
Life Policies (discussing industry resistance to life insurance cost disclosure).
355. See J. Robert Hunter, A Failure of Oversight in Need of Rescue: Insurance Regulation, GOV’T L.
& POL’Y J., Winter 2011, at 6 (exploring how excessive industry influence, limited consumer
empowerment, and lack of regulatory will and resources combine to produce an ineffective
regulatory regime). For a recent review of regulatory capture theory, see PREVENTING
REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW
TO LIMIT IT, supra note 99.
356. See Randall, supra note 110, at 629–34 (discussing industry influence over insurance regulators).
357. Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, Regulator Performance, Regulatory Environment and
Outcomes: An Examination of Insurance Regulator Career Incentives on State Insurance Markets,
32 J. BANKING & FIN. 116, 121 (2008).
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capacities of regulatory staff or the limited number of consumer advocates who
operate in the insurance domain.358
The more difficult question is why the industry uniformly resists market
transparency, given that it would presumably benefit a subset of firms already offering better products or prices. More specifically, why do insurers that offer better products, more reliable claims handling, or lower pricing fail to agitate for
more robust regulatory transparency? Part of the answer may be cultural: Insurance is an industry that is almost uniquely built on proprietary information.359
This arguably produces an almost knee-jerk reaction by those within the industry
to resist regulatory efforts that may result in information revelation.
Alternatively, high-quality insurers might worry that transparency could
expose them to adverse selection by causing high-risk individuals to prefer their
coverage.360 Although this concern is theoretically plausible, it is practically quite
limited: Most insurance markets do not suffer from adverse selection and, in
many cases, the consumers who are likely to be drawn to the most generous forms
of insurance are actually relatively nonrisky, but quite risk averse.361
High-quality insurers may also resist regulatory initiatives designed to promote market accountability to the extent that they can reach their target customers
without regulation through advertising campaigns and networks of intermediaries.362 If so, they may have less reason to be concerned that some segment of
consumers unwittingly purchases coverage from low-quality carriers. Transparency-based regulation could therefore produce limited benefits for the firm itself
while increasing regulatory compliance costs and potentially even eroding their
market niche by causing low-quality competitors to improve their products and
their pricing.
Beyond industry influence, a second explanation for states’ resistance to
transparency is that state regulators want to limit their own public accountability.
As described above, the complexity of insurance inevitably demands various
forms of substantive consumer protection regulation.363 Transparency in insurance markets provides an important disciplining force on the exercise of this
358. See Schwarcz, supra note 99 (discussing the limited number of advocacy organizations that

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

operate in the life and property/casualty insurance domains); Wendy Wagner, Administrative
Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1321 (2010) (discussing
general phenomena of information capture).
See François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 197 (Graham Burchell
et al. eds., 1991).
See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 7 (2d ed. 2008).
See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE
L.J. 1223, 1264–65 (2004).
See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1336–38.
See Jackson, supra note 6.
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regulation by allowing consumers and market intermediaries to identify its potential failings.364 But while this is a social benefit that should simultaneously
promote more effective regulation while reining in unnecessary regulation, it exposes state regulators to greater public scrutiny, which they may prefer to avoid.
Yet a third explanation for the inverted pattern of state insurance regulation
is that state lawmakers do not have sufficient political incentives to promote
transparency-based regimes. Insurance regulators tend to be quite responsive to
political issues that become salient to the public.365 But transparency tends not to
be such an issue: Unlike substantive regulation, which directly targets regulatory
problems, transparency-based reforms operate indirectly by harnessing market
forces to prevent regulatory problems.366 If consumers do not fully appreciate this
value of transparency, state lawmakers may face limited incentives to implement
such reforms.367
A final explanation is historical: Insurance regulation was originally modeled in large part on utilities regulation.368 Not only was insurance viewed as a
practical necessity, but it was also understood to have features of a natural monopoly because of the need for individual companies to pool and share their historic loss data in order to make accurate future projections.369 Utilities regulation
tends to focus predominantly on the regulation of rates, as well as various other
forms of substantive regulation.370 Insurance was thus originally understood to
require a similar regulatory approach. From this origin, state regulators may have
simply continued to rely on substantive regulation rather than transparency.
B.

Toward More Transparent Insurance Markets

Although the political economy of state insurance regulation is indeed
complicated and multifaceted, one consistent force has tended to promote effective regulatory reforms. Over the last century, glaring inadequacies in state insurance regulation have tended to persist unless and until states are threatened with
the risk of losing their regulatory authority. Once a credible threat of federal
preemption emerges, however, state insurance regulators often prove quite capa-

364. See supra Part II.B, Coverage Consistent with Consumers’ Reasonable Expectations.
365. See Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein, The Perfect Storm: Hurricanes, Insurance, and

Regulation, 12 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 81, 81–83 (2009).

366. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1267–68.
367. This explanation is consistent with the pattern in securities law, as state blue sky laws tended to focus

less on disclosure than on substantive regulation relative to federal securities regulation.
368. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 668–73 (2013).
369. See Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1270–72.
370. See Abraham, supra note 368, at 668.
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ble and effective. In lieu of a complete federal takeover of state insurance regulation, which remains unlikely, the best approach to promoting effective consumer
protection regulation is to focus a bright federal spotlight on the transparency issue
and back that up with a specific and credible threat of federal preemption.
1. State Reform of Insurance Regulation in Response to Federal Scrutiny
In a variety of regulatory domains, including banking and corporate law,
state law has been consistently and dramatically influenced by the prospect that
the federal government will exercise previously untapped authority.371 This
threat of action typically causes states to bridge the gap between their laws and
those that the federal government might enact. Doing so decreases the benefits
to the federal government of acting while simultaneously signaling to it that exerting its power will be politically difficult.372
Nowhere is this dynamic easier to see than in the context of state insurance
regulation: The threat of federal preemption has been the primary driver of state
insurance regulatory reform over the last century.373 Indeed, modern state insurance regulation was largely forged in response to the Southeastern Supreme Court
case, which opened the door to federal preemption by concluding that insurance
was subject to Congress’s authority to regulate commerce.374 In the wake of that
decision, the NAIC and the industry helped draft and pass the McCarranFerguson Act, which largely enshrined states as the regulators of insurance.375
And in response to that Act, which limited states’ antitrust exemption if they
failed to regulate the business of insurance, states developed and enacted a substantial portion of modern insurance regulatory law.376
Since that time, virtually all substantial state insurance regulatory reforms
can be clearly and directly traced back to acute threats of federal preemption.
Consider solvency regulation, which is widely regarded to be the most important

371. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking
372.
373.

374.
375.
376.

System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 678 (1988); see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition,
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 601 (2003).
See Roe, supra note 371.
See, e.g., Scott E. Harrington, The History of Federal Involvement in Insurance Regulation, in
OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 21,
21 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2000) (“The history of insurance regulation is characterized by a
series of perceived market or regulatory failures, followed by threats of federal regulation and
subsequent changes by the states that have helped forestall federal action.”).
See United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 571 (1944); see also
MEIER, supra note 353.
See MEIER, supra note 353.
See id.
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and effective element of state regulation.377 The insurance solvency regime is
centered on two core pillars: a risk-based capital requirement and a scheme of
state accreditation, which is coordinated and enforced by the NAIC and several
of its committees.378 Both reforms were developed and put into place only in the
early 1990s, after several insurer insolvencies prompted a highly critical congressional report and series of hearings.379 Similarly, state guarantee funds were put
in place in response to a proposed Federal Insurance Act, which itself was
prompted by several large insurer insolvencies.380
Although state reforms in the solvency domain are the most important
modern example of this process of federally triggered state insurance reform, numerous other examples exist. For instance, state regulators’ numerous efforts to
limit the duplicative and overlapping nature of state insurance product requirements—including the Interstate Insurance Product Regulatory Commission and
State Electronic Rate and Form Filing—were directly responsive to very public
campaigns by certain large property/casualty insurers and life insurers for the
adoption of an Optional Federal Charter.381 Similarly, recent efforts to limit the
inconsistencies in state insurance producer licensing were triggered by a direct
preemption threat contained within the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, which required a national scheme for producer licensing if states did not act.382 Perhaps
most notably for present purposes, state lawmakers developed an excellent consumer tool for disclosing the terms of health insurance policies after the ACA
delegated this responsibility to them, subject to the approval of HHS.383
377. See VAUGHAN, supra note 264.
378. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, THE UNITED STATES INSURANCE FINANCIAL
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SOLVENCY FRAMEWORK (2010), http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_us_solvency
_framework.pdf. States have very strong reasons to maintain accreditation because of the
system’s ingenious design: Accredited states can only rely on the regulatory efforts of other
accredited states. Failing to maintain accreditation thus risks subjecting domestic insurers to
duplicative regulation.
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF COMM. ON ENERGY &
COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY INSOLVENCIES
(Comm. Print 1990).
See Brown, supra note 312, at 12–13.
See Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 1779.
Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the GrammLeach-Bliley Act, 25 J. CORP. L. 723, 765–66 (2000).
The ACA requires that Health and Human Services (HHS) consult with the NAIC in
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2. Expanding the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Jurisdiction
to Encompass Insurance
All of this suggests that the path to reform of state insurance regulation ultimately lies with federal actors. If federal lawmakers do not push state lawmakers and regulators to take market transparency seriously, they will not do so.
Fortunately, there is a simple and sensible way for the federal government to create an ongoing threat of preemption that depends on states making insurance
markets more transparent.
Federal lawmakers could amend Dodd-Frank to extend the CFPB’s jurisdiction to insurance markets.384 Ideally, such a jurisdictional extension would allow the CFPB to promulgate and enforce rules that the agency reasonably deems
necessary to promote more transparent insurance markets. The resulting regulatory framework would leave states as the primary insurance regulators, but it
would create the prospect of preemption by the CFPB in cases in which states inadequately ensure transparency.385
The CFPB would be well situated to take on this role of promoting more
transparent insurance markets. In fact, the CFPB currently devotes extensive attention to ensuring market transparency in the domain of consumer credit.386
Drawing on substantial empirical testing and analysis, it has already made meaningful progress toward this goal: In the last several months, it has promulgated
admirable disclosure rules for mortgages and established an online database of
consumer complaints for credit card companies.387 Much of this work would be
directly relevant to improving the transparency of insurance markets, as many of
the challenges of communicating effectively with consumers and the larger public
about credit and insurance are quite similar.
Appropriately expanding the CFPB’s jurisdiction to encompass insurance
could place substantial and ongoing pressure on state lawmakers and regulators to
promote more transparent insurance markets.388 So long as the CFPB’s authority
to promulgate rules in the insurance domain was dependent on a preliminary deter384. Currently, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act explicitly excludes insurance from the
385.
386.
387.
388.

CFPB’s jurisdiction. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 1002(3), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955 (2010).
It would thus resemble the regulatory structure currently in place for state-regulated banks.
See id.
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS: FALL 2012 (2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervisory-highlights-fall-2012.pdf.
See Kennedy et al., supra note 28, at 1160–67.
Although numerous insurance regulators exist at the state level, they are not currently subject
to meaningful regulatory competition because they have exclusive authority over insurance
transactions that take place within their border. See Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 1708–09.
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mination of inadequately transparent insurance markets, states would have a strong
incentive to enhance market transparency proactively. Doing so would limit the
risk that the CFPB would impose new rules or restrictions, both because such efforts would have less impact and because states would be better positioned to
challenge them in court. So long as the CFPB’s statutory grant of power were
appropriately drafted, a court could strike down any attempted exercise of the
CFPB’s insurance authority if the agency did not, in fact, have a reasonable basis for
believing its rules were necessary to promote more transparent insurance markets.
To the extent that extending the CFPB’s jurisdiction to insurance failed to
prompt appropriate reforms at the state level, it would serve the alternative purpose of facilitating a transition to the federalization of insurance regulation. Federalizing insurance regulation is a perennial topic of discussion among
policymakers,389 and many believe that Dodd-Frank took a partial step in that direction by creating a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO).390 If such federalization
ever were to occur completely, our recent history in the banking sphere strongly
suggests that it would be appropriate to assign consumer protection responsibilities to an agency such as the CFPB, which is independent of insurers’ primary
prudential regulators.391 Providing the CFPB with preliminary authority to study
and regulate the insurance domain could thus facilitate any such transition.
3. Answering Objections
Various important objections can be raised against expanding the CFPB’s
jurisdiction to encompass insurance in particular. First, many commentators
have argued that transparency-oriented consumer protections have often had the
effect of crowding out more effective substantive regulations.392 By embracing
such regulatory approaches, lawmakers may create the appearance of having acted
while preserving industry profit.393 A similar point could be made here: By focusing state lawmakers on improving market transparency, the law may actually undermine important substantive regulations such as mandated policy provisions or
enhanced suitability requirements.
389. See generally OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE
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Transparently Opaque

461

Although such objections are entirely reasonable as a political matter, this
Article aims to dispel the false choice between transparency and substantive regulation. Its premise is that effective consumer protection often requires both substantive regulation and transparency. There is no logical reason why these two
regulatory approaches are mutually exclusive and, in fact, there are many ways in
which they can be mutually reinforcing. Arguably, this fact is reflected in the most
important consumer protection developments in recent years. Thus, the Credit
CARD Act, the Affordable Care Act, and the Dodd-Frank Act all contain both
new disclosure rules as well as meaningful substantive restrictions on firms.394 At
the very least, these developments demonstrate that reforms aimed at promoting
market transparency need not crowd out effective substantive regulation.
A second objection is that the CFPB is not the ideal agency within which to
lodge authority over insurance consumer protection. The CFPB has been mired
in controversy since its genesis and has engaged in an overwhelming amount of
work reforming credit markets during its limited existence. Moreover, the SEC
arguably has more natural expertise in certain insurance products, as it already exercises jurisdiction over certain variable life and annuity products and focuses on
promoting disclosure of firms’ balance sheets, which is an important component
of insurance solvency regulation.
There is little doubt that the SEC would indeed have some comparative advantages to the CFPB in promoting more transparency in insurance markets.
This might be particularly true with respect to full disclosure strategies, which are
much more consistent with the SEC’s approach to securities regulation generally.
On balance, however, the CFPB seems to present a better option than the SEC
because it has devoted substantial energy to promoting both full disclosure and
individual consumer understanding of complex financial products. Moreover,
the CFPB’s youth has certain advantages: The SEC has endured numerous turf
battles with state insurance regulators that could undermine its ability to work
cooperatively with them. No such history clouds the CFPB. The CFPB’s youth
also provides it with a distinctive amount of enthusiasm—a benefit that is particularly important given that the main goal of expanding federal authority to insurance consumer protection would be to create a credible threat of preemption
that would spur state-based regulatory reform.

394. See supra note 4.
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CONCLUSION
In many ways, state insurance regulation is uniquely aggressive in its approach to protecting consumers. As a result, commentators have historically
overlooked the fact that state insurance regulation systematically and consistently
fails to promote the most basic consumer protection of all: market transparency.
The resulting pattern of state insurance regulation is both costly and ineffective.
It is time for the federal government to demand that states modernize their approach to consumer protection by effectively combining market transparency
with substantive regulation in ways that truly promote consumers’ interests.

